Managing foreign subsidiaries: agents of headquarters, or an interdependent network?
Abstract
In this study, two different theoretical perspectives are used to develop sets of hypotheses regarding the mechanisms used to manage foreign subsidiaries of multinational corporations. First, agency theory serves as the basis for a model that predicts the use of monitoring mechanisms and incentive compensation. Then, it is argued that these mechanisms are insufficient for managing subsidiaries characterized by high levels of intra-firm...
Paper Details
Title
Managing foreign subsidiaries: agents of headquarters, or an interdependent network?
Published Date
May 1, 2000
Journal
Volume
21
Issue
5
Pages
525 - 548
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Notes
History