Public Choice
Papers 4780
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#1Dodge Cahan (UCSD: University of California, San Diego)H-Index: 2
#2Luisa Doerr (Fo: Ifo Institute for Economic Research)H-Index: 1
Last.Niklas Potrafke (Fo: Ifo Institute for Economic Research)H-Index: 25
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We examine the extent to which government ideology has influenced monetary policy in OECD countries since the 1970s. In line with important changes in the global econ-omy and differences across countries, regression results yield heterogeneous infer-ences depending on the time period and the exchange rate regime/central bank de-pendence of the countries in the sample. Over the 1972-2010 period, Taylor rule speci-fications do not suggest a relationship between government ideology and monetary pol...
#1André Casajus (HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management)H-Index: 10
#2Frank Huettner (European School of Management and Technology)H-Index: 2
The Coleman Power of the Collectivity to Act (CPCA) is a popular statistic that re flects the ability of a committee to pass a proposal. Applying the Shapley value to this measure, we derive a new power index that indicates each voter's contribution to the CPCA. This index is characterized by four axioms: anonymity, the null voter property, transfer property, and a property that stipulates that sum of the voters' power equals the CPCA. Similar to the Shapley-Shubik index (SSI) and the Penrose-Ba...
#1Clara Jace (GMU: George Mason University)
The School of Salamanca often is identified as the first economic tradition in the history of the “dismal science”. Its members anticipated principles later developed by the likes of Adam Smith and Carl Menger. This paper provides an economic theory of the production of economic analysis by the Doctors of Salamanca, beginning from the observation that producers of economic analysis respond to incentives the same way producers of meat, beer, or bread do. Historically, the demand for economic anal...
#1Susumu Shikano (University of Konstanz)H-Index: 10
#2Dominic NyhuisH-Index: 3
A number of studies recently have investigated party position-taking in multilevel polities. Given the attempts of federally organized parties to tailor their messages to their audiences, we investigate the voter side of the equation: Are voters sufficiently politically sophisticated to pick up on highly differentiated policy signals? Following common conceptions of political preferences, we argue that citizens have a heuristic view of party competition that is shaped by ideological and valence ...
#1Bong Hwan Kim (SNU: Seoul National University)H-Index: 1
#2Sounman Hong (Yonsei University)H-Index: 8
This study explores whether changes in political leadership affect the survival of chief executive officers (CEOs) of Korean state-owned enterprises (SOEs). On the basis of observations of the turnovers of 18 SOEs’ executives during 2000–2015, we demonstrate that political change is significantly associated with CEO turnover, even in the presence of institutional systems designed to achieve political insularity. That association may serve as suggestive but compelling evidence of presidential int...
#1Alejandro Ecker (UMA: University of Mannheim)
#2Thomas M. Meyer (University of Vienna)H-Index: 9
How do political parties divide coalition payoffs in multiparty governments? Perhaps the most striking answer to this question is Gamson’s Law, which suggests a strong fairness norm in the allocation of office payoffs among coalition partners. Building upon recent advancements in portfolio allocation research, we extend this approach in three important ways. First, we study fairness with regard to the allocation of policy (rather than office) payoffs. Second, we introduce measures to assess the ...
#1Robert F. Salvino (CCU: Coastal Carolina University)H-Index: 3
#2Gregory M. Randolph (Southern New Hampshire University)H-Index: 2
Last.Michael T. Tasto (Southern New Hampshire University)H-Index: 3
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It is well established in the literature that the number of interest group organizations varies across countries and states, with economic freedom and other institutional factors playing important roles in economic growth and prosperity. At the same time, the literature offers little empirical evidence of the influence of institutions on interest group behavior. This study presents new evidence on the extent to which institutional structure, in particular state and local governmental fiscal dece...
#1Christine MeleH-Index: 1
#2A SiegelDavid (Duke University)H-Index: 13
Last.David A. Siegel (Duke University)H-Index: 56
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When do persecuted ethnic minority groups choose to assimilate into the dominant majority group, rather than differentiate from it, and how do states respond? We argue that any answer to these questions must consider the joint effects of identity on state repression and the possibility of ethnic conflict. We posit two mechanisms through which identity acts: (1) mobilization and (2) operational capacity, defined as the ability of the group to contest state repression successfully. We show that mi...
#1Hakan Genc (UNIBO: University of Bologna)
#2Serkan Kucuksenel (METU: Middle East Technical University)H-Index: 3
This paper studies a sequential model of multilateral bargaining under majority rule in which legislators make decisions in both private and public good dimensions via an endogenous recognition process. Legislators can expend resources to become the proposer and to make proposals about the allocation of private and public goods. We show that legislators exert unproductive effort to be the proposer and make proposals in both dimensions depending on legislative preferences. Effort choices in equil...
#1Alexander Dentler (CIDE: Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas)
The literature on political business cycles focuses on elected incumbents and neglects the incentives of appointed officials. We present evidence of rate hikes before elections when the chair of the US Federal Reserve is from a different party than the incumbent president. This finding contrasts with the traditional belief that an inappropriate policy-rate bias implies a more expansive pre-election policy stance. We also find weak evidence that rates are lowered when the chair and president are ...