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International Journal of Industrial Organization
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#1Dirk Czarnitzki (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)H-Index: 41
#2Paul Hünermund (UM: Maastricht University)H-Index: 3
Last. Nima Moshgbar (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)H-Index: 1
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Abstract Using public procurement to promote private innovation activities has attracted increasing attention recently. Germany implemented a legal change in its procurement framework in 2009, which allowed government agencies to specify innovative aspects of procured products as selection criteria in calls for tender. We analyze a sample of 3410 German firms to investigate whether this reform stimulated innovation in the business sector. Across a wide range of specifications – OLS, nearest-neig...
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#1George Deltas (UIUC: University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign)H-Index: 14
#2Simon J. Evenett (HSG: University of St. Gallen)H-Index: 23
Abstract Provision of government contract information in English reduces the barriers to participation by foreign suppliers. We measure this effect using data from the country of Georgia, where English translations of government tenders were provided above specified contract size thresholds, which varied over time and across contract types. The provision of English documentation more than doubles foreign company participation for low value contracts, and leads to smaller, though still substantia...
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Abstract This article demonstrates that entry deterrence can occur when downstream incumbents hold non-controlling ownership shares of a supplier that does not price-discriminate. Such backward ownership implies a rebate on the input price for the incumbents and a competitive disadvantage for downstream entrants. An industry can use non-controlling ownership to change the pricing of a supplier in a way that appears to be accommodating but in fact deters entry. The supplier benefits from an oblig...
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Abstract We consider procurement auctions for the projects where the cost of production is subject to ex-post shocks—cost overruns. The contractor may default due to these overruns, which affects the buyer’s expected cost. Here the lowest-bid auction emerges as the procurement mechanism that: i) minimizes the expected transfers to the contractors, and ii) requires the lowest surety bond to achieve a given probability of default. Since surety bonds are costly to post, the above makes a combinatio...
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Abstract An active empirical literature estimates entry threshold ratios (ETRs), introduced by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), to learn about the impact of firm entry on competition. We show that in the standard homogeneous goods oligopoly model, there is no monotonic relationship with the price-cost margin, one measure for the strength of competition. Regardless of the shape of demand, the ETR is hump-shaped in the number of active firms. It can also increase with entry in the Salop model of produc...
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#1Chao Ma (Ha Tai: Xiamen University)H-Index: 2
#1Chao Ma (Ha Tai: Xiamen University)
Abstract Theoretically, if firms face a regulatory per-customer quantity limit, they should have an incentive to discriminatively charge high-demand customers higher prices and make them just willing to buy a quantity equal to the limit. In the U.S. residential mortgage industry, mortgages with origination balances above the conforming loan limits cannot be guaranteed by Government-Sponsored Enterprises, which make lenders face a per-customer quantity limit. This paper finds that borrowers bunch...
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Abstract We experimentally investigate the determinants of post-cartel tacit collusion (PCTC), the effects of PCTC on market outcomes, and potential policy measures aimed at its prevention. PCTC occurs robustly with or without fines or leniency and is determined both by collusive price hysteresis and learning about cartel partners’ characteristics and strategies. As a result, it is also strongly related to the preceding cartel success. PCTC generates a downward bias in the estimated cartel overc...
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Abstract Branded drug manufacturers issue copay coupons to compete with generics as their brands are coming off patent. To explore the impact of copay coupons on pricing and welfare, I estimate a model of demand and supply using data on sales, advertising, and copayment for cholesterol-lowering drugs and perform a counterfactual analysis to simulate equilibrium pricing with copay coupons used for price discrimination and moral hazard. Copay coupons issued for price discrimination make the drug w...
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#1Yiquan Gu (University of Liverpool)H-Index: 9
#2Tobias Wenzel (University of Sheffield)H-Index: 17
Abstract This paper develops a market model where consumers refrain from buying products that they are unable to understand and a firm can influence the probability of a consumer understanding its offer. In equilibrium, firms artificially increase product complexity, and firms that offer more transparent products choose on average higher prices. We study two sets of public policies. We show that consumer side policies may have the unintended consequence of encouraging obfuscation while firm side...
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#1Shengyu Li (UNSW: University of New South Wales)H-Index: 3
#2Rong Luo (RUC: Renmin University of China)
Abstract Retailer differentiation exists in most industries and gives manufacturers an incentive to contract with different retailers to penetrate a market. This paper analyzes the impact of this penetration effect on vertical contract exclusivity in an oligopolistic model with differentiated retailers. In the model, manufacturers endogenously choose contract types and negotiate with retailers on wholesale prices. We show that, when the penetration effect is sufficiently strong, non-exclusive co...
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Oligopoly
Economics
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Incentive
Industrial organization