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Theory and Decision
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#1Andreas Glöckner (MPG: Max Planck Society)H-Index: 28
#2Baiba Renerte (University of Konstanz)
Last. Ulrich Schmidt (UJ: University of Johannesburg)H-Index: 25
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The majority consensus in the empirical literature is that probability weighting functions are typically inverse-S shaped, that is, people tend to overweight small and underweight large probabilities. A separate stream of literature has reported event-splitting effects (also called violations of coalescing) and shown that they can explain violations of expected utility. This leads to the questions whether (1) the observed shape of weighting functions is a mere consequence of the coalesced presen...
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#1Gabriele ChierchiaH-Index: 1
#2Fabio TufanoH-Index: 5
Last. Giorgio CoricelliH-Index: 20
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#1Jonas Hedlund (UTD: University of Texas at Dallas)
Last. Malte Lammert (UCSD: University of California, San Diego)
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This paper introduces a receiver who perceives ambiguity in a binary model of Bayesian persuasion. The sender has a well-defined prior, while the receiver considers an interval of priors and maximizes a convex combination of worst and best expected payoffs ( $\alpha -maxmin preferences). We characterize the sender’s optimal signal and find that the receiver’s payoff differences across states given each action (sensitivities), play a fundamental role in the characterization and the comparativ...
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#1Susumu Cato (UTokyo: University of Tokyo)H-Index: 2
This paper examines collective decision-making with an infinite-time horizon setting. First, we establish a result on the collection of decisive sets: if there are at least four alternatives and Arrow’s axioms are satisfied on the selfish domain, then the collection of decisive sets forms an ultrafilter. Second, we impose generalized versions of stationarity axiom for social preferences, which are substantially weaker than the standard version. We show that if any of our generalized versions are...
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Sengupta and Sengupta (1994) consider a payoff configuration of a TU game as a viable proposal if it challenges each legitimate contender. Lauwers (2002) prove that the set of viable proposals is nonempty for every game. In the present paper, we prove that the set of viable proposals coincides with the coalition structure core if there exists an undominated proposal; otherwise, it coincides with the set of accessible proposals. This characterization result implies that a proposal is a viable pro...
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#1Vittorio Pelligra (University of Cagliari)H-Index: 7
#2Tommaso Reggiani (Masaryk University)H-Index: 4
Last. Daniel John Zizzo (UQ: University of Queensland)H-Index: 22
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We consider the notions of static and dynamic reasonableness of requests by an authority in a trust game experiment. The authority, modelled as the experimenter, systematically varies the experimental norm of what is expected from trustees to return to trustors, both in terms of the level of each request and in terms of the sequence of the requests. Static reasonableness matters in a self-biased way, in the sense that low requests justify returning less, but high requests tend to be ignored. Dyn...
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#1Subrato Banerjee (QUT: Queensland University of Technology)
Part of the equation in sub-section “Key findings” is missing in the original publication of the article. The error was caused by the fact that the equation, due to its length, exceeded the page width. The missing part of the equation is given below:
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#1Wei James Chen (NCU: National Central University)
#2Joseph Tao-yi Wang (NTU: National Taiwan University)H-Index: 10
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We conduct a laboratory experiment using the Monty Hall problem to study how simplified examples improve learning behavior and correct irrational choices in probabilistic situations. In particular, we show that after experiencing a simplified version of the MHP (the 100-door version), subjects perform better in the MHP (the 3-door version), compared to the control group who only experienced the 3-door version. Our results suggest that simplified examples strongly induces learning.
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Top fields of study
Mathematical economics
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Decision theory
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Welfare economics