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Philipp Genschel
European University Institute
80Publications
17H-index
1,100Citations
Publications 80
Newest
Published on May 22, 2019in Review of International Organizations 2.69
Laura Seelkopf4
Estimated H-index: 4
,
Moritz Bubek + 5 AuthorsPhilipp Genschel17
Estimated H-index: 17
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Published on Jan 4, 2019in Regulation & Governance 2.73
Kenneth W. Abbott26
Estimated H-index: 26
,
Philipp Genschel17
Estimated H-index: 17
(EUI: European University Institute)
+ 1 AuthorsBernhard Zangl3
Estimated H-index: 3
(LMU: Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich)
Most governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. Principal–agent theory views indirect governance primarily as a problem of information: the agent has an informational advantage over the principal, which it can exploit to evade principal control. But indirect governance creates a more fundamental problem of power. Competent intermediaries with needed expertise, credibility, legitimacy, and/or operational capacity are inherently difficult to control because the policy benefits the...
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Published on Jan 1, 2018in Journal of Common Market Studies 2.09
Philipp Genschel17
Estimated H-index: 17
(EUI: European University Institute),
Markus Jachtenfuchs7
Estimated H-index: 7
The Eurozone crisis and the refugee crisis are showcases of the problems associated with the EU’s shift from market integration to the integration of core state powers. The integration of core state powers responds to similar functional demand factors as market integration (interdependence, externalities and spill-over) but its supply is more tightly constrained by a high propensity for zero-sum conflict, a functional requirement for centralized fiscal, coercive and administrative capacities, an...
14 Citations Source Cite
Published on Jan 1, 2018
Kenneth W. Abbott26
Estimated H-index: 26
,
Philipp Genschel17
Estimated H-index: 17
+ 1 AuthorsBernhard Zangl3
Estimated H-index: 3
No governor has sufficient capabilities to govern single-handedly; all governors rely on agents, and thus become principals. The "governor's dilemma" results from the tradeoff between agent competence and principal control. Competent agents are difficult to control because their policy contributions give them leverage over the principal; principal control impedes agent competence by constraining the development and exercise of agent capabilities. If a principal emphasizes control, it limits agen...
Published on Jan 1, 2017
Philipp Genschel17
Estimated H-index: 17
,
Bernhard Zangl3
Estimated H-index: 3
Source Cite
Published on Oct 1, 2016in British Journal of Political Science 3.33
Kenneth W. Abbott26
Estimated H-index: 26
(ASU: Arizona State University),
Philipp Genschel17
Estimated H-index: 17
(EUI: European University Institute)
+ 1 AuthorsBernhard Zangl14
Estimated H-index: 14
(LMU: Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich)
This article introduces the concept of orchestration as the mobilization of an intermediary by an orchestrator on a voluntary basis in pursuit of a joint governance goal. Orchestrator-Intermediary theory then provides a model of indirect governance that supplements delegation models premised on principal-agent theory. Under both theories, governors enhance their governance capacity by drawing on the capabilities of third parties. Whereas delegation is premised on hard ‘contractual’ control over ...
21 Citations Source Cite
Published on Sep 1, 2016in Journal of Public Policy 1.26
Hilke Brockmann5
Estimated H-index: 5
(JU: Jacobs University Bremen),
Philipp Genschel17
Estimated H-index: 17
(EUI: European University Institute),
Laura Seelkopf4
Estimated H-index: 4
(University of Bremen)
Can governments increase tax compliance by rewarding honest taxpayers? We conducted a controlled laboratory experiment comparing tax compliance under a “deterrence” baseline with tax compliance under two “reward” treatments: a “donation” treatment giving taxpayers a say in the spending purposes of their payments and a “lucky” treatment giving taxpayers the (highly unlikely) chance of winning a lottery. The reward treatments significantly affected tax behaviour but not in a straightforward manner...
10 Citations Source Cite
Published on Mar 3, 2016in Review of International Political Economy 2.53
Philipp Genschel17
Estimated H-index: 17
(EUI: European University Institute),
Hanna Lierse4
Estimated H-index: 4
(JU: Jacobs University Bremen),
Laura Seelkopf4
Estimated H-index: 4
(University of Bremen)
It pays to be a tax haven. Ireland has become rich that way. Why do not all countries cut their capital taxes to get wealthy? One reason is structural. As the standard model of tax competition explains, small countries gain from competitive tax cuts while large countries suffer. Yet not all small (large) countries have low (high) capital taxes. Why? The reason, we argue, is political. While the standard model assumes governments to be democratic, more than a third of countries worldwide are non-...
7 Citations Source Cite
Published on Mar 3, 2016in Review of International Political Economy 2.53
Philipp Genschel17
Estimated H-index: 17
(EUI: European University Institute),
Laura Seelkopf4
Estimated H-index: 4
(University of Bremen)
We map trends of tax policy change in developing countries and transition economies since the 1980s, compare them to tax trends in the advanced Western democracies and review some of the explanations offered by the contributions to this volume. We find that non-Western countries follow the lead of Western countries in some important respects but not in others. While non-Western countries brought their general revenues closer to Western levels and copied important features of Western consumption ...
6 Citations Source Cite
Published on Jan 2, 2016in Journal of European Public Policy 2.99
Philipp Genschel17
Estimated H-index: 17
(EUI: European University Institute),
Markus Jachtenfuchs7
Estimated H-index: 7
(Hertie School of Governance)
ABSTRACTWe map the pattern and extent of the European integration of core state powers (coercive force, public finance and public administration) and analyse causes and consequences. We highlight two findings: First, in contrast to historical examples of federal state-building, where the nationalization of core state powers precipitated the institutional, territorial and political consolidation of the emerging state, the European integration of core state powers is associated with the institutio...
40 Citations Source Cite
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