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Philipp Genschel
Jacobs University Bremen
Value-added taxEconomicsTax competitionDouble taxationTax reform
82Publications
19H-index
1,269Citations
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Publications 82
Newest
#1Kenneth W. AbbottH-Index: 26
#2Philipp GenschelH-Index: 19
Last. Bernhard ZanglH-Index: 15
view all 4 authors...
Source
#1Björn Bremer (MPG: Max Planck Society)H-Index: 1
#2Philipp Genschel (EUI: European University Institute)H-Index: 19
Last. Markus Jachtenfuchs (Hertie School of Governance)H-Index: 8
view all 3 authors...
In this study we analysed the patterns and covariates of public support for the European integration of core state powers based on an original new survey. We found considerable variation across integration instruments, member states and policy issues. Horizontal transfers are supported more than vertical capacity building; member states from the EU's South‐East are more supportive than states from the North‐West; and support increases from debt relief to unemployment assistance, sharing the burd...
3 CitationsSource
#1Björn Bremer (MPG: Max Planck Society)H-Index: 1
#2Philipp GenschelH-Index: 19
#1Laura Seelkopf (LMU: Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich)H-Index: 2
Last. Philipp Genschel (JU: Jacobs University Bremen)H-Index: 19
view all 8 authors...
This article describes the new Tax Introduction Dataset (TID). Listing the year and the mode of the first permanent introduction of six major taxes (inheritance tax, personal income tax, corporate income tax, social security contributions, general sales tax and value added tax) in 220 countries, 1750–2018, TID is the most comprehensive dataset of its kind. The comprehensiveness of our measure is of critical value to empirical work on the causes of tax innovation and its consequences for state, s...
Source
#1Kenneth W. Abbott (ASU: Arizona State University)H-Index: 26
#2Philipp Genschel (EUI: European University Institute)H-Index: 19
Last. Bernhard Zangl (LMU: Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich)H-Index: 15
view all 4 authors...
Most governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. Principal–agent theory views indirect governance primarily as a problem of information: the agent has an informational advantage over the principal, which it can exploit to evade principal control. But indirect governance creates a more fundamental problem of power. Competent intermediaries with needed expertise, credibility, legitimacy, and/or operational capacity are inherently difficult to control because the policy benefits the...
1 CitationsSource
#1Philipp GenschelH-Index: 19
#2Laura SeelkopfH-Index: 2
3 Citations
#1Kenneth W. AbbottH-Index: 26
#2Philipp GenschelH-Index: 19
Last. Bernhard ZanglH-Index: 15
view all 4 authors...
#1Philipp Genschel (EUI: European University Institute)H-Index: 19
The Eurozone crisis and the refugee crisis are showcases of the problems associated with the EU’s shift from market integration to the integration of core state powers. The integration of core state powers responds to similar functional demand factors as market integration (interdependence, externalities and spill-over) but its supply is more tightly constrained by a high propensity for zero-sum conflict, a functional requirement for centralized fiscal, coercive and administrative capacities, an...
22 CitationsSource
#1Kenneth W. AbbottH-Index: 26
#2Philipp GenschelH-Index: 19
Last. Bernhard ZanglH-Index: 15
view all 4 authors...
No governor has sufficient capabilities to govern single-handedly; all governors rely on agents, and thus become principals. The "governor's dilemma" results from the tradeoff between agent competence and principal control. Competent agents are difficult to control because their policy contributions give them leverage over the principal; principal control impedes agent competence by constraining the development and exercise of agent capabilities. If a principal emphasizes control, it limits agen...
1 Citations
#1Philipp GenschelH-Index: 19
#2Bernhard ZanglH-Index: 15
Source
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