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Steffen Ganghof
University of Potsdam
72Publications
15H-index
702Citations
Publications 72
Newest
Published on Jul 3, 2019in German Politics 1.46
Steffen Ganghof15
Estimated H-index: 15
,
Sebastian Eppner3
Estimated H-index: 3
+ 2 AuthorsStefan Schukraft
A widespread view in political science is that minority cabinets govern more flexibly and inclusively, more in line with a median-oriented and 'consensual' vision of democracy. Yet there is only little empirical evidence for it. We study legislative coalition-building in the German state of North-Rhine-Westphalia, which was ruled by a minority government between 2010 and 2012. We compare the inclusiveness of legislative coalitions under minority and majority cabinets, based on 1028 laws passed i...
Published on Feb 1, 2019in Politics 1.38
Steffen Ganghof15
Estimated H-index: 15
(University of Potsdam),
Sebastian Eppner3
Estimated H-index: 3
(University of Potsdam)
Arend Lijphart uses an average of five standardized variables – the executive-parties dimension (EPD) – to describe patterns of democracy and explain differences in democracies’ performance. The article suggests ways to improve the descriptive part of the project. It argues that the EPD maps different approaches to achieving accountability and representation, rather than differences in consensus. This re-conceptualization leads to a more coherent and valid measurement. It is also argued that mor...
Published on Jul 23, 2018
Steffen Ganghof15
Estimated H-index: 15
An egalitarian approach to the fair representation of voters specifies three main institutional requirements: proportional representation, legislative majority rule and a parliamentary system of government. This approach faces two challenges: the under-determination of the resulting democratic process and the idea of a trade-off between equal voter representation and government accountability. Linking conceptual with comparative analysis, the article argues that we can distinguish three ideal-ty...
Published on Jul 10, 2018
Steffen Ganghof15
Estimated H-index: 15
,
Sebastian Eppner3
Estimated H-index: 3
,
Alexander Pörschke1
Estimated H-index: 1
The article analyses the type of bicameralism we find in Australia as a distinct executive-legislative system – a hybrid between parliamentary and presidential government – which we call ‘semi- parliamentary government’. We argue that this hybrid presents an important and underappreciated alternative to pure parliamentary government as well as presidential forms of the power-separation, and that it can achieve a certain balance between competing models or visions of democracy. We specify theoret...
Published on May 1, 2018in European Journal of Political Research 3.07
Steffen Ganghof15
Estimated H-index: 15
(University of Potsdam)
Semi-parliamentary government is a distinct executive-legislative system that mirrors semi-presidentialism. It exists when the legislature is divided into two equally legitimate parts, only one of which can dismiss the prime minister in a no-confidence vote. This system has distinct advantages over pure parliamentary and presidential systems: it establishes a branch-based separation of powers and can balance the ‘majoritarian’ and ‘proportional’ visions of democracy without concentrating executi...
Published on Apr 3, 2018in Australian Journal of Political Science 0.84
Steffen Ganghof15
Estimated H-index: 15
(University of Potsdam),
Sebastian Eppner3
Estimated H-index: 3
(University of Potsdam),
Alexander Pörschke1
Estimated H-index: 1
(University of Potsdam)
ABSTRACTThe article responds to four commentaries on the concept of semi-parliamentary government and its application to Australian bicameralism. It highlights four main points: (1) Our preferred typology is not more ‘normative’ than existing approaches, but applies the criterion of ‘direct election’ equally to executive and legislature; (2) While the evolution of semi-parliamentary government had contingent elements, it plausibly also reflects the ‘equilibrium’ nature of certain institutional c...
Published on Apr 3, 2018in Australian Journal of Political Science 0.84
Steffen Ganghof15
Estimated H-index: 15
(University of Potsdam),
Sebastian Eppner3
Estimated H-index: 3
(University of Potsdam),
Alexander Pörschke1
Estimated H-index: 1
(University of Potsdam)
ABSTRACTThe article analyses the type of bicameralism we find in Australia as a distinct executive-legislative system – a hybrid between parliamentary and presidential government – which we call ‘semi-parliamentary government’. We argue that this hybrid presents an important and underappreciated alternative to pure parliamentary government as well as presidential forms of the power-separation, and that it can achieve a certain balance between competing models or visions of democracy. We specify ...
Published on Mar 29, 2018
Steffen Ganghof15
Estimated H-index: 15
The project of public-reason liberalism faces a basic problem: publicly justified principles are typically too abstract and vague to be directly applied to practical political disputes, whereas applicable specifications of these principles are not uniquely publicly justified. One solution could be a legislative procedure that selects one member from the eligible set of inconclusively justified proposals. Yet if liberal principles are too vague to select sufficiently specific legislative proposal...
Published on Feb 1, 2017in Political Studies Review 1.19
Steffen Ganghof15
Estimated H-index: 15
(University of Potsdam)
Veto player theory is a powerful approach to comparative politics. The article argues that the debate about its explanatory success would benefit from more systematic distinctions. The theory not only comes in different theoretical variants, it is also used in radically different ways empirically. Starting from recent debates about the “testing” of theoretical models, the article distinguishes five types of how theoretical models can be used empirically: (1) contrastive, (2) axiomatic, (3) explo...
Published on Feb 1, 2017in European Journal of Political Research 3.07
Sebastian Eppner3
Estimated H-index: 3
(University of Potsdam),
Steffen Ganghof15
Estimated H-index: 15
(University of Potsdam)
Are potential cabinets more likely to form when they control institutional veto players such as symmetric second chambers or minority vetoes? Existing evidence for a causal effect of veto control has been weak. This article presents evidence for this effect on the basis of conditional and mixed logit analyses of government formations in 21 parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies between 1955 and 2012. It also shows that the size of the effect varies systematically across political-instit...
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