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Steffen Ganghof
University of Potsdam
74Publications
15H-index
773Citations
Publications 75
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#1Steffen Ganghof (University of Potsdam)H-Index: 15
This article analyses salient trade-offs in the design of democracy. It grounds this analysis in a distinction between two basic models of democracy: simple and complex majoritarianism. These models differ not only in their electoral and party systems, but also in the style of coalition-building. Simple majoritarianism concentrates executive power in a single majority party; complex majoritarianism envisions the formation of shifting, issue-specific coalitions among multiple parties whose progra...
2 CitationsSource
#1Steffen GanghofH-Index: 15
#2Sebastian EppnerH-Index: 4
Last.Stefan SchukraftH-Index: 1
view all 5 authors...
A widespread view in political science is that minority cabinets govern more flexibly and inclusively, more in line with a median-oriented and 'consensual' vision of democracy. Yet there is only little empirical evidence for it. We study legislative coalition-building in the German state of North-Rhine-Westphalia, which was ruled by a minority government between 2010 and 2012. We compare the inclusiveness of legislative coalitions under minority and majority cabinets, based on 1028 laws passed i...
2 CitationsSource
#1Steffen GanghofH-Index: 15
#2Sebastian EppnerH-Index: 4
Die Fragmentierung europaischer Parteiensysteme und damit verbundene Schwierigkeiten bei der Koalitionsbildung haben zu einer Neuauflage altbekannter Debatten uber unterschiedliche Wahlsysteme gefuhrt. Einige Autoren sehen dabei bestimmte Wahlsysteme als optimalen Kompromiss zwischen den Prinzipien der Mehrheits- und der Verhaltniswahl an. Wir argumentieren, dass diese Optimalitatsargumente eine konzeptionelle Schlagseite zugunsten „majoritarer“ Demokratiekonzeptionen haben. Eine anspruchsvolle ...
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#1Steffen Ganghof (University of Potsdam)H-Index: 15
#2Sebastian Eppner (University of Potsdam)H-Index: 4
Arend Lijphart uses an average of five standardized variables – the executive-parties dimension (EPD) – to describe patterns of democracy and explain differences in democracies’ performance. The article suggests ways to improve the descriptive part of the project. It argues that the EPD maps different approaches to achieving accountability and representation, rather than differences in consensus. This re-conceptualization leads to a more coherent and valid measurement. It is also argued that mor...
4 CitationsSource
#1Steffen GanghofH-Index: 15
An egalitarian approach to the fair representation of voters specifies three main institutional requirements: proportional representation, legislative majority rule and a parliamentary system of government. This approach faces two challenges: the under-determination of the resulting democratic process and the idea of a trade-off between equal voter representation and government accountability. Linking conceptual with comparative analysis, the article argues that we can distinguish three ideal-ty...
#1Steffen GanghofH-Index: 15
#2Sebastian EppnerH-Index: 4
Last.Alexander PörschkeH-Index: 1
view all 3 authors...
The article analyses the type of bicameralism we find in Australia as a distinct executive-legislative system – a hybrid between parliamentary and presidential government – which we call ‘semi- parliamentary government’. We argue that this hybrid presents an important and underappreciated alternative to pure parliamentary government as well as presidential forms of the power-separation, and that it can achieve a certain balance between competing models or visions of democracy. We specify theoret...
Semi-parliamentary government is a distinct executive-legislative system that mirrors semi-presidentialism. It exists when the legislature is divided into two equally legitimate parts, only one of which can dismiss the prime minister in a no-confidence vote. This system has distinct advantages over pure parliamentary and presidential systems: it establishes a branch-based separation of powers and can balance the ‘majoritarian’ and ‘proportional’ visions of democracy without concentrating executi...
4 CitationsSource
#1Steffen Ganghof (University of Potsdam)H-Index: 15
#2Sebastian Eppner (University of Potsdam)H-Index: 4
Last.Alexander Pörschke (University of Potsdam)H-Index: 1
view all 3 authors...
ABSTRACTThe article responds to four commentaries on the concept of semi-parliamentary government and its application to Australian bicameralism. It highlights four main points: (1) Our preferred typology is not more ‘normative’ than existing approaches, but applies the criterion of ‘direct election’ equally to executive and legislature; (2) While the evolution of semi-parliamentary government had contingent elements, it plausibly also reflects the ‘equilibrium’ nature of certain institutional c...
Source
#1Steffen Ganghof (University of Potsdam)H-Index: 15
#2Sebastian Eppner (University of Potsdam)H-Index: 4
Last.Alexander Pörschke (University of Potsdam)H-Index: 1
view all 3 authors...
ABSTRACTThe article analyses the type of bicameralism we find in Australia as a distinct executive-legislative system – a hybrid between parliamentary and presidential government – which we call ‘semi-parliamentary government’. We argue that this hybrid presents an important and underappreciated alternative to pure parliamentary government as well as presidential forms of the power-separation, and that it can achieve a certain balance between competing models or visions of democracy. We specify ...
6 CitationsSource
#1Steffen GanghofH-Index: 15
The project of public-reason liberalism faces a basic problem: publicly justified principles are typically too abstract and vague to be directly applied to practical political disputes, whereas applicable specifications of these principles are not uniquely publicly justified. One solution could be a legislative procedure that selects one member from the eligible set of inconclusively justified proposals. Yet if liberal principles are too vague to select sufficiently specific legislative proposal...
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