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Bernhard Zangl
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich
63Publications
14H-index
598Citations
Publications 63
Newest
Published on Jan 4, 2019in Regulation & Governance 2.79
Kenneth W. Abbott26
Estimated H-index: 26
,
Philipp Genschel17
Estimated H-index: 17
(EUI: European University Institute)
+ 1 AuthorsBernhard Zangl3
Estimated H-index: 3
(LMU: Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich)
Most governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. Principal–agent theory views indirect governance primarily as a problem of information: the agent has an informational advantage over the principal, which it can exploit to evade principal control. But indirect governance creates a more fundamental problem of power. Competent intermediaries with needed expertise, credibility, legitimacy, and/or operational capacity are inherently difficult to control because the policy benefits the...
Published on Jan 1, 2018
Kenneth W. Abbott26
Estimated H-index: 26
,
Philipp Genschel17
Estimated H-index: 17
+ 1 AuthorsBernhard Zangl3
Estimated H-index: 3
No governor has sufficient capabilities to govern single-handedly; all governors rely on agents, and thus become principals. The "governor's dilemma" results from the tradeoff between agent competence and principal control. Competent agents are difficult to control because their policy contributions give them leverage over the principal; principal control impedes agent competence by constraining the development and exercise of agent capabilities. If a principal emphasizes control, it limits agen...
Published on Jul 1, 2017in Journal of Common Market Studies 2.75
Berthold Rittberger22
Estimated H-index: 22
(LMU: Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich),
Helena Schwarzenbeck2
Estimated H-index: 2
(LMU: Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich),
Bernhard Zangl14
Estimated H-index: 14
(LMU: Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich)
Who is held publicly responsible for the policies of international institutions? Are member states or supranational bodies held responsible or are public responsibility attributions (PRA) untargeted? We argue that in complex policy-making systems responsibility tends to be attributed to implementing actors. When, however, a policy does not require active implementation, we expect responsibility attributions to be untargeted. To test these expectations, we analyze PRA in the European public for t...
Published on Jan 1, 2017in Journal of Common Market Studies 2.75
Berthold Rittberger22
Estimated H-index: 22
,
Helena Schwarzenbeck2
Estimated H-index: 2
,
Bernhard Zangl14
Estimated H-index: 14
Who is held publicly responsible for the policies of international institutions? Are member states or supranational bodies held responsible or are public responsibility attributions (PRA) untargeted? We argue that in complex policy‐making systems responsibility tends to be attributed to implementing actors. When, however, a policy does not require active implementation, we expect responsibility attributions to be untargeted. To test these expectations, we analyze PRA in the European public for t...
Published on Jan 1, 2017
Philipp Genschel17
Estimated H-index: 17
,
Bernhard Zangl3
Estimated H-index: 3
Published on Oct 1, 2016in British Journal of Political Science 4.29
Kenneth W. Abbott26
Estimated H-index: 26
(ASU: Arizona State University),
Philipp Genschel17
Estimated H-index: 17
(EUI: European University Institute)
+ 1 AuthorsBernhard Zangl14
Estimated H-index: 14
(LMU: Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich)
This article introduces the concept of orchestration as the mobilization of an intermediary by an orchestrator on a voluntary basis in pursuit of a joint governance goal. Orchestrator-Intermediary theory then provides a model of indirect governance that supplements delegation models premised on principal-agent theory. Under both theories, governors enhance their governance capacity by drawing on the capabilities of third parties. Whereas delegation is premised on hard ‘contractual’ control over ...
Published on Jun 1, 2016in Review of International Organizations 1.76
Bernhard Zangl14
Estimated H-index: 14
(LMU: Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich),
Frederick Heußner1
Estimated H-index: 1
(LMU: Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich)
+ 1 AuthorsXenia Lanzendörfer1
Estimated H-index: 1
(LMU: Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich)
How do international institutions adjust to shifting power distributions among their members? We argue that institutional adaptations to the rise of emerging and the decline of established powers are different from what power transition theories (PTTs) would lead us to believe. Institutional adaptations are not impossible, as pessimist PTT variants hold; and they are rarely easy to attain, let alone perfect, as optimist PTT variants imply. To bridge the gap between these versions of PTT, we prop...
Published on Jan 1, 2016in EconStor Open Access Articles
Christian Kreuder-Sonnen2
Estimated H-index: 2
,
Bernhard Zangl14
Estimated H-index: 14
This essay analyses the consequences of contested multilateralism (CM) for the level of constitutionalisation of specific multilateral institutions. We argue that CM has implications for institutions’ constitutional quality in particular if it is polity-driven and not (merely) policy-driven, that is, when actors’ employment of alternative institutions stems from their dissatisfaction with the political order of an institution rather than individual policies. Given the co-existence of constitutio...
Published on Sep 1, 2015in European Journal of International Relations 2.76
Christian Kreuder-Sonnen2
Estimated H-index: 2
,
Bernhard Zangl14
Estimated H-index: 14
(LMU: Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich)
The most recent transformation of world order is often depicted as a shift from a Westphalian to a post-Westphalian era in which international organizations are becoming increasingly independent sites of authority. This internationalization of authority is often considered as an indication of the constitutionalization of the global legal order. However, this article highlights that international organizations can also exercise authority in an authoritarian fashion that violates the same constitu...
Published on Jul 10, 2015
Philipp Genschel17
Estimated H-index: 17
,
Bernhard Zangl3
Estimated H-index: 3
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