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Kenneth W. Abbott
Arizona State University
120Publications
26H-index
4,328Citations
Publications 120
Newest
Published on Apr 1, 2019
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Published on Jan 4, 2019in Regulation & Governance 2.73
Kenneth W. Abbott26
Estimated H-index: 26
,
Philipp Genschel17
Estimated H-index: 17
(EUI: European University Institute)
+ 1 AuthorsBernhard Zangl3
Estimated H-index: 3
(LMU: Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich)
Most governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. Principal–agent theory views indirect governance primarily as a problem of information: the agent has an informational advantage over the principal, which it can exploit to evade principal control. But indirect governance creates a more fundamental problem of power. Competent intermediaries with needed expertise, credibility, legitimacy, and/or operational capacity are inherently difficult to control because the policy benefits the...
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Published on Jan 1, 2018
Kenneth W. Abbott26
Estimated H-index: 26
(ASU: Arizona State University),
Céline Kauffmann7
Estimated H-index: 7
(OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development),
Jeong-Rim Lee
This study takes stock of the membership, governance structure, operational mode and regulatory power of trans-governmental networks of regulators (TGNs). It contributes to a greater OECD project aimed at building greater understanding of the benefits and pitfalls of various approaches to international regulatory co-operation (IRC) as identified in OECD (2013), International Regulatory Co-operation: Addressing Global Challenges. In order to fill the knowledge gap, this study provides a working d...
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Published on Jan 1, 2018
Kenneth W. Abbott26
Estimated H-index: 26
,
Philipp Genschel17
Estimated H-index: 17
+ 1 AuthorsBernhard Zangl3
Estimated H-index: 3
No governor has sufficient capabilities to govern single-handedly; all governors rely on agents, and thus become principals. The "governor's dilemma" results from the tradeoff between agent competence and principal control. Competent agents are difficult to control because their policy contributions give them leverage over the principal; principal control impedes agent competence by constraining the development and exercise of agent capabilities. If a principal emphasizes control, it limits agen...
Published on Jan 1, 2018
Phillip Paiement2
Estimated H-index: 2
,
Stepan Wood10
Estimated H-index: 10
+ 3 AuthorsErrol Meidinger19
Estimated H-index: 19
1 Citations
Published on Jul 4, 2017in Environmental Politics 2.69
Kenneth W. Abbott26
Estimated H-index: 26
(ASU: Arizona State University)
ABSTRACTA striking development in climate governance is the emergence of systems for non-state actors to make voluntary commitments alongside state undertakings. Because these commitments involve diverse actors carrying out diverse activities in diverse settings, they provide unprecedented opportunities for experimentation and learning. Yet voluntary commitment systems (VCS) rarely promote experimentation and provide few systematic learning mechanisms. Based on work with Duncan Snidal, an argume...
13 Citations Source Cite
Published on Jun 8, 2017
Kenneth W. Abbott26
Estimated H-index: 26
1 Citations Source Cite
Kenneth W. Abbott26
Estimated H-index: 26
(ASU: Arizona State University),
David Levi-Faur28
Estimated H-index: 28
(HUJI: Hebrew University of Jerusalem),
Duncan Snidal27
Estimated H-index: 27
(University of Oxford)
12 Citations Source Cite
Kenneth W. Abbott26
Estimated H-index: 26
(ASU: Arizona State University),
David Levi-Faur28
Estimated H-index: 28
(HUJI: Hebrew University of Jerusalem),
Duncan Snidal27
Estimated H-index: 27
(University of Oxford)
Regulation should be theorized as a three-party relationship (RIT), with intermediaries (I) playing diverse roles between the regulator (R) and the targets of regulation (T). Here we summarize and assess extensions of the basic RIT model introduced in the volume, including changes in regulatory relationships over time, chains of regulatory actors, and networks. We also draw lessons for regulatory policy from the volume as a whole, emphasizing the diverse goals that intermediaries pursue; the imp...
6 Citations Source Cite
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