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Vincent Mak
University of Cambridge
40Publications
8H-index
175Citations
Publications 40
Newest
#1Amnon Rapoport (UA: University of Arizona)H-Index: 48
#2Hang Qi (Huda: Hubei University)
Last.Eyran J. Gisches (UA: University of Arizona)H-Index: 8
view all 4 authors...
Abstract We investigate a class of social dilemmas that arise when a heterogeneous group of agents potentially benefit from a joint enterprise such as ridesharing. Participation in the enterprise incurs positive externalities to other participants; social welfare is maximized with full participation. However, if some agents find it a dominant strategy to opt out, then the potential benefit from the enterprise will decrease, leading to more members opting out. This iterated disincentivizing effec...
#1Vincent Mak (University of Cambridge)H-Index: 8
#2Darryl A. Seale (UNLV: University of Nevada, Las Vegas)H-Index: 17
Last.Eyran J. Gisches (UA: University of Arizona)H-Index: 8
view all 4 authors...
We propose a committee extension of the individual sequential search model called the “secretary problem,” where collective decisions on when to stop the search are reached via a prespecified votin...
#1Katherine T. Li (UNC: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)H-Index: 2
#2Weiming TangH-Index: 10
Last.Larry Han (University of Cambridge)H-Index: 7
view all 10 authors...
Summary Background Chinese men who have sex with men (MSM) rarely receive gonorrhoea and chlamydia testing. The purpose of this pilot study was to evaluate a pay-it-forward strategy to increase uptake of gonorrhoea and chlamydia testing among MSM. Methods We performed a quasi-experimental pragmatic study to compare a pay-it-forward model with standard of care at two HIV testing sites for MSM in Guangzhou, China: an STD clinic for MSM and a local MSM community-based organisation. All men who arri...
#1Amnon Rapoport (UCR: University of California, Riverside)H-Index: 48
#2Vincent Mak (University of Cambridge)H-Index: 8
#1Vincent Mak (University of Cambridge)H-Index: 8
#2Darryl A. Seale (UNLV: University of Nevada, Las Vegas)H-Index: 17
Last.Rui Yang (UC: University of California)H-Index: 1
view all 7 authors...
Within the last decade, there has been a dramatic bloom in ridesharing businesses along with the emergence of new enabling technologies. A central issue in ridesharing, which is also important in the general domain of cost-sharing in economics and computer science, is that the sharing of cost implies positive externalities and hence coordination problems for the network users. We investigate these problems experimentally in the present study. In particular, we focus on how sequential observabili...
#1Vincent Mak (University of Cambridge)H-Index: 8
#2Darryl A. Seale (UNLV: University of Nevada, Las Vegas)H-Index: 17
Last.Amnon Rapoport (UCR: University of California, Riverside)H-Index: 48
view all 7 authors...
The Braess Paradox (BP) illustrates an important counterintuitive observation that adding links to a directed transportation network with usage externalities may raise the costs of all users. Research on the BP traditionally focuses on congestible networks. We propose and experimentally test a new and more dramatic version of the BP, where the network exhibits both congestion (negative externalities) and cost†sharing (positive externalities) characteristics. Our design also involves experiment...
#1Raghabendra P. Kc (University of Cambridge)
#2Marcus Kunter (European University)H-Index: 1
Last.Vincent Mak (University of Cambridge)H-Index: 8
view all 3 authors...
We report a series of experimental studies that investigate the influence of a competition on noncompetitors who do not participate in it but are aware of it. Our work is highly relevant across many domains of social life where competitions are prevalent, as it is typical in a competition that the competitors are far outnumbered by these noncompetitors. In our field experiment involving pay-what-you-want entrance at a German zoo ( n = 22,886), customers who were aware of a competition over entra...
#1Vincent MakH-Index: 8
#2Amnon RapoportH-Index: 48
Last.Eyran J. GischesH-Index: 8
view all 3 authors...
Focusing on sellers’ pricing decisions and the ensuing seller-buyer interactions, we report an experiment on dynamic pricing with scarcity in the form of capacity constraints. Rational expectations equilibrium solutions are constructed and then tested experimentally with subjects assigned the roles of sellers and buyers. We investigate behavior in two between-subject conditions with high and moderate levels of capacity. Our laboratory market exhibits strategic sophistication: the price offers of...
#1Martin SpannH-Index: 21
#2Robert ZeithammerH-Index: 10
Last.Manoj ThomasH-Index: 11
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Driven by the low transaction costs and interactive nature of the internet, customer participation in the price-setting process has increased. Today, platforms such as eBay have popularized online auctions on a global scale, Priceline has made headlines with its name-your-own-price (NYOP) business model, and Humble Bundle has enabled independent musicians and game developers to market their works through pay-what-you-want (PWYW) pricing. Advertising exchanges conduct several hundred million indi...
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