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Hanna Lierse
University of Bremen
14Publications
4H-index
46Citations
Publications 14
Newest
Published on Sep 1, 2016in Comparative European Politics 1.20
Hanna Lierse4
Estimated H-index: 4
(JU: Jacobs University Bremen),
Laura Seelkopf4
Estimated H-index: 4
(JU: Jacobs University Bremen)
Since the creation of monetary union, European governments have received loans from the international financial markets at low interest rates. The recent sovereign debt crisis has, however, once more revealed the structural dependence of capitalist governments on the capital markets. Countries such as Spain and Greece are charged unsustainable interest rates and their policy decisions have come under scrutiny by international bond holders who fear losing their investments. Based on a unique data...
Published on Mar 3, 2016in Review of International Political Economy 2.80
Laura Seelkopf4
Estimated H-index: 4
(University of Bremen),
Hanna Lierse4
Estimated H-index: 4
(JU: Jacobs University Bremen),
Carina Schmitt10
Estimated H-index: 10
(University of Bremen)
For a long time, governments relied heavily on trade taxes as the main source of public finance, and for some countries, mainly less developed ones, they still account for a large share of revenue. Yet, with trade liberalization, governments have been forced to abandon these easy-to-collect taxes and to adopt modern hard-to-collect taxes, mainly internal income and consumption taxes. Surprisingly, we know little about how governments across the world have addressed this common challenge. In this...
Published on Mar 3, 2016in Review of International Political Economy 2.80
Philipp Genschel17
Estimated H-index: 17
(EUI: European University Institute),
Hanna Lierse4
Estimated H-index: 4
(JU: Jacobs University Bremen),
Laura Seelkopf4
Estimated H-index: 4
(University of Bremen)
It pays to be a tax haven. Ireland has become rich that way. Why do not all countries cut their capital taxes to get wealthy? One reason is structural. As the standard model of tax competition explains, small countries gain from competitive tax cuts while large countries suffer. Yet not all small (large) countries have low (high) capital taxes. Why? The reason, we argue, is political. While the standard model assumes governments to be democratic, more than a third of countries worldwide are non-...
Published on Jan 2, 2016in New Political Economy 3.08
Hanna Lierse4
Estimated H-index: 4
(JU: Jacobs University Bremen),
Laura Seelkopf4
Estimated H-index: 4
(JU: Jacobs University Bremen)
Globalisation has triggered a downwards trend in direct taxation as governments compete for internationally mobile capital. This popular postulation has blurred the attention to potential upward constraints on tax policy-making emanating from globalised capital markets. In this paper, we illustrate when and how capital markets exert an upward pressure on taxes. While the increasing access to international capital allowed governments in developed democracies to indulge their voters with deficit-f...
Published on Dec 1, 2015in Politics & Society 2.27
Carina Schmitt10
Estimated H-index: 10
(University of Bremen),
Hanna Lierse4
Estimated H-index: 4
(JU: Jacobs University Bremen)
+ 1 AuthorsLaura Seelkopf4
Estimated H-index: 4
(University of Bremen)
Comparative welfare state research is directed mainly toward the development of welfare states in advanced democracies, although the majority of people live outside the OECD and often face graver social risks arising from poverty and starvation. To secure a minimum standard of living, nearly all countries have introduced social programs to protect their citizens. Yet the timing of when governments take on the responsibility of providing social protection varies decisively across the world. Using...
Published on Jan 1, 2015
Philipp Genschel17
Estimated H-index: 17
,
Hanna Lierse4
Estimated H-index: 4
+ 3 AuthorsHongyan Yang
The baseline model of international tax competition predicts that domestic income inequality will increase: in the worst case progressive taxation on capital is no longer possible and spending levels deteriorate. Given that the median voter is receiving her income mostly from labor, many observers are puzzled that corporate tax competition persists among developed democracies. Even during the economic crisis, hard-hit countries such as Ireland insisted to keep their low corporate tax rate despit...
Stefan Collignon12
Estimated H-index: 12
(LSE: London School of Economics and Political Science),
Piero Esposito5
Estimated H-index: 5
(Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies),
Hanna Lierse4
Estimated H-index: 4
(JU: Jacobs University Bremen)
The European economy was hit by a confidence shock in 2009 when the Greek government of Papandreou discovered the true amount of public deficit. The subsequent loss of trust in European fiscal governance reduced financial markets' willingness to lend to indebted governments. The European Union established the Financial Stability Facility to support debt-ridden states but without lasting success. The continuously rising Greek bond yields suggest that the information transmitted from political lea...
Published on Dec 1, 2012in Journal of Public Policy 1.80
Hanna Lierse4
Estimated H-index: 4
(JU: Jacobs University Bremen)
With the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, European governments extensively intervened to avert a severe economic recession. Taxation is a crucial instrument to achieve such economic objectives, but it also represents a redistributive tool in democratic societies. Generally, left-wing parties are more supportive of progressive taxes and redistribution than right-wing governments. As a crisis response, one could assume that European governments, especially social-democratic ones, reinforc...
Published on Jun 28, 2012
Rune Ellemose Gulev4
Estimated H-index: 4
,
Hanna Lierse4
Estimated H-index: 4
12