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Marc Knez
University of Chicago
Coordination gameEconomicsMarketingGame theorySocial psychology
10Publications
9H-index
907Citations
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Publications 13
Newest
#1Roberto A. Weber (CMU: Carnegie Mellon University)H-Index: 27
#2Colin F. Camerer (California Institute of Technology)H-Index: 102
Last. Marc KnezH-Index: 9
view all 3 authors...
Previous studies have shown that simply knowing one player moves first can affect behavior in games, even when the first-mover's moves are known to be unobservable. This observation violates the game-theoretic principle that timing of unobserved moves is irrelevant, but is consistent with virtual observability, a theory of how timing can matter without the ability to observe actions. However, this previous research only shows that timing matters in games where knowledge that one player moved fir...
106 CitationsSource
#1George Wu (U of C: University of Chicago)H-Index: 20
#2Chip Heath (Stanford University)H-Index: 19
Last. Marc KnezH-Index: 9
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Managers often lament that their employees are risk averse and do not take sufficient risks. While in some instances employees might in fact be too risk averse, we explore situations in which managers may incorrectly judge their employees to be overly risk averse or timid. In two studies, we find evidence of a timidity error in evaluations—evaluators judge target decision makers to be risk averse, even when the targets are actually employing a more thoughtful approach (as measured by better cali...
6 CitationsSource
#1Duncan Simester (MIT: Massachusetts Institute of Technology)H-Index: 31
#2Marc KnezH-Index: 3
We compare bargaining costs with internal and external suppliers using a unique data set describing internal and external transactions for the same categories of parts at a single firm. The findings confirm that direct bargaining costs are higher with external suppliers, at least in part because there is more to bargain over. We also observed higher indirect bargaining costs with external suppliers. Information that may hinder contractual negotiations is often suppressed or delayed. To enforce t...
56 CitationsSource
5 Citations
In February 1995 Continental Airlines introduced an incentive scheme that promised monthly bonuses to all 35,000 hourly employees if the company achieved a firm‐wide performance goal. Conventional wisdom suggests that free riding will render such schemes ineffective. We present evidence indicating that the incentive scheme raised employee performance despite the apparent threat of free riding. To explain why the scheme may have been effective we argue that the organization of employees into auto...
250 CitationsSource
#1Roberto A. Weber (CMU: Carnegie Mellon University)H-Index: 27
#2Colin F. CamererH-Index: 102
Last. Marc KnezH-Index: 9
view all 4 authors...
This paper reports the results of experiments which examine attributions of leadership quality. Subjects played an abstract coordination game which is like many organizational problems. Previous research showed that when larger groups play the game, they rarely coordinate on the Pareto-optimal (efficient) outcome, but small groups almost always coordinate on the efficient outcome. After two or three periods of playing the game, one subject who was randomly selected from among the participants to...
162 CitationsSource
#1Marc Knez (U of C: University of Chicago)H-Index: 9
#2Colin F. Camerer (California Institute of Technology)H-Index: 102
Coordination games have multiple Nash equilibria (i.e., sets of strategies which are best responses to one another). In weak-link coordination games players choose a number 1–7. Their payoff is increasing in the minimum number (or weakest link) and decreasing in the difference between their number and the minimum. Choosing 7 is an efficient equilibrium because it gives everybody a higher payoff than any other coordinated choice. Higher-payoff equilibria are riskier, however, so the game expresse...
116 CitationsSource
#1Roberto A. WeberH-Index: 27
#2Colin F. CamererH-Index: 102
Last. Marc KnezH-Index: 9
view all 3 authors...
This paper reports experiments which examine attributions of leadership quality due to differences in situations. Subjects played an abstract coordination game which is analogous to some organizational situations. Previous research showed that when large groups play the game, they rarely coordinate on the Pareto-optimal (efficient) outcome, but small groups almost always coordinate on a Pareto-optimal outcome. After two or three periods of playing the game, one subject who was randomly selected ...
27 Citations
#1Colin F. CamererH-Index: 102
#2Marc Knez (U of C: University of Chicago)H-Index: 9
Management literature focuses on two modes of coordination: formal and informal structures. Informal structure grants significant discretion to individual actions. Yet two impediments are related to such flexibility, those created by opportunism and those created by convergent expectations. Impediments arising from convergent expectations exist when the expectations of all members of an interdependent system are not properly aligned. We use non-cooperative game theory to provide a foundation for...
75 CitationsSource
#1Colin F. CamererH-Index: 102
#2Marc KnezH-Index: 9
Classic literature on organizations recognizes that the paramount function of an organization is the coordination of physical and human assets to produce a good or service (e.g., Barnard, 1938; Chisholm, 1989; Schein, 1985). Coordination in this early literature was defined broadly, as for example by Mooney (1947, p. 5): "Coordination therefore, is the orderly arrangement of group effort, to provide unity of action in the pursuit of a common purpose." Mooney argues further that coordination is t...
57 CitationsSource
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