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Marc Knez
University of Chicago
13Publications
11H-index
1,150Citations
Publications 13
Newest
#1Roberto A. Weber (CMU: Carnegie Mellon University)H-Index: 24
#2Colin F. Camerer (California Institute of Technology)H-Index: 99
Last.Marc KnezH-Index: 11
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Previous studies have shown that simply knowing one player moves first can affect behavior in games, even when the first-mover's moves are known to be unobservable. This observation violates the game-theoretic principle that timing of unobserved moves is irrelevant, but is consistent with virtual observability, a theory of how timing can matter without the ability to observe actions. However, this previous research only shows that timing matters in games where knowledge that one player moved fir...
#1George Wu (U of C: University of Chicago)H-Index: 21
#2Chip Heath (Stanford University)H-Index: 20
Last.Marc KnezH-Index: 11
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Managers often lament that their employees are risk averse and do not take sufficient risks. While in some instances employees might in fact be too risk averse, we explore situations in which managers may incorrectly judge their employees to be overly risk averse or timid. In two studies, we find evidence of a timidity error in evaluations—evaluators judge target decision makers to be risk averse, even when the targets are actually employing a more thoughtful approach (as measured by better cali...
#1Roberto A. Weber (CMU: Carnegie Mellon University)H-Index: 24
#2Colin F. CamererH-Index: 99
Last.Marc KnezH-Index: 11
view all 4 authors...
This paper reports the results of experiments which examine attributions of leadership quality. Subjects played an abstract coordination game which is like many organizational problems. Previous research showed that when larger groups play the game, they rarely coordinate on the Pareto-optimal (efficient) outcome, but small groups almost always coordinate on the efficient outcome. After two or three periods of playing the game, one subject who was randomly selected from among the participants to...
#1Marc Knez (U of C: University of Chicago)H-Index: 11
#2Colin F. Camerer (California Institute of Technology)H-Index: 99
Coordination games have multiple Nash equilibria (i.e., sets of strategies which are best responses to one another). In weak-link coordination games players choose a number 1–7. Their payoff is increasing in the minimum number (or weakest link) and decreasing in the difference between their number and the minimum. Choosing 7 is an efficient equilibrium because it gives everybody a higher payoff than any other coordinated choice. Higher-payoff equilibria are riskier, however, so the game expresse...
#1Roberto A. WeberH-Index: 24
#2Colin F. CamererH-Index: 99
Last.Marc KnezH-Index: 11
view all 3 authors...
This paper reports experiments which examine attributions of leadership quality due to differences in situations. Subjects played an abstract coordination game which is analogous to some organizational situations. Previous research showed that when large groups play the game, they rarely coordinate on the Pareto-optimal (efficient) outcome, but small groups almost always coordinate on a Pareto-optimal outcome. After two or three periods of playing the game, one subject who was randomly selected ...
#1Colin F. CamererH-Index: 99
#2Marc KnezH-Index: 11
Classic literature on organizations recognizes that the paramount function of an organization is the coordination of physical and human assets to produce a good or service (e.g., Barnard, 1938; Chisholm, 1989; Schein, 1985). Coordination in this early literature was defined broadly, as for example by Mooney (1947, p. 5): "Coordination therefore, is the orderly arrangement of group effort, to provide unity of action in the pursuit of a common purpose." Mooney argues further that coordination is t...
#1Colin F. CamererH-Index: 99
#2Marc Knez (U of C: University of Chicago)H-Index: 11
Management literature focuses on two modes of coordination: formal and informal structures. Informal structure grants significant discretion to individual actions. Yet two impediments are related to such flexibility, those created by opportunism and those created by convergent expectations. Impediments arising from convergent expectations exist when the expectations of all members of an interdependent system are not properly aligned. We use non-cooperative game theory to provide a foundation for...
We conducted ultimatum games in which a proposer offers a division of 10 to a respondent, who accepts or rejects it. If an offer is rejected, players receive a known outside option. Our proposers made simultaneous offers to two respondents, with outside options of and $4. The rate of rejected offers was higher than in similar studies, around 50%, and persisted across five trials. Outside options seem to make players "egocentrically" apply different interpretations of the amount being divided...
#1Marc Knez (U of C: University of Chicago)H-Index: 11
#2Colin F. Camerer (California Institute of Technology)H-Index: 99
We study coordination games with multiple equilibria, in which players are penalized for picking numbers higher than the minimum anybody picks, and everyone prefers a larger minimum. 'Weakest-link' games like this model organizational situations in which the worst component of a product or process determines its overall quality. In experimental groups, the best equilibrium was reached infrequently. Aggregating two groups into a larger one always hurt. We argue that players' beliefs about what th...
#1Chip Heath (U of C: University of Chicago)H-Index: 7
#2Marc Knez (U of C: University of Chicago)H-Index: 11
Last.Colin F. Camerer (U of C: University of Chicago)H-Index: 99
view all 3 authors...
Over time, members of organizations develop entitlements-preferences about how they wish to be treated and beliefs about how they should be treated. The formation of entitlements is an important subject for strategy researchers because employees resist changes that violate their perceived entitlements; thus entitlements constrain an organization's ability to adapt quickly in a changing environment. In this paper, we use psychological research to propose a two-part model of entitlements formation...
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