Patrick Van Cayseele
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
FinanceBusinessEconomicsMicroeconomicsIndustrial organization
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Publications 40
#1Patrick Van Cayseele (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)H-Index: 8
#2Stijn Vanormelingen (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)H-Index: 8
This paper builds a structural model for both advertising and readers’ demand in the Belgian newspaper industry, taking into account cross network effects that exist between advertisers and newspaper readers We combine our parameter estimates with the publishers’ first-order conditions to simulate the impact of a merger. We find a limited impact of the merger on reader and advertiser welfare. The effect on welfare is easily offset by possible efficiency gains. We compare the simulation outcome w...
#1Ilona Sergant (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)H-Index: 1
#2Patrick Van Cayseele (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)H-Index: 8
This paper investigates the relationship between State aid measures, as defined by Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and firm performance in terms of total factor productivity (TFP). Under imperfect capital markets, firms might encounter difficulties in accessing sufficient resources to fund their optimal investment plans. The main focus of this paper lies in establishing whether State aid alleviates a firm from such constraints, and thereby enhances its ...
In situations where one repeatedly makes decisions under the influence of another, how does the former react to the latter—obey or disobey—in order to change the future exertion of influence? We study a repeated game between a decision maker and an external influence in which the former’s regard for the latter is persistent private information. We show that concern for the future leads to more disobedience under negative influence and more obedience under positive influence. The acts of obedienc...
#1Maarten Goos (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)H-Index: 9
#2Patrick Van Cayseele (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)H-Index: 8
Last. Bert Willekens (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)H-Index: 1
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Existing models of two-sided markets explain why platforms charge different prices between buyers and sellers. Generally, the platform will subsidize participation on a side of the market the higher is that side’s positive cross-side externality to users on the other side of the market. However, in matching markets there also exists a negative own-side congestion externality that the platform internalizes by taxing users for its presence. Assuming a monopoly platform pricing model, the first con...
5 CitationsSource
#2Simon MiegielsenH-Index: 1
A common supplier (the hub) could try to enforce a collusive outcome between his buyers (the spokes) if they are unable to sustain such an agreement among themselves. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which the hub is willing to assume the policing role in a cartel.
2 Citations
#1André DecosterH-Index: 12
#2Lodewijk BerlageH-Index: 1
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#1Dries De Smet (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)H-Index: 2
#2Patrick Van Cayseele (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)H-Index: 8
In this article, we examine the universal service obligation for telephone directories. In most countries, this obligation consists of two parts. First, publishers must offer a comprehensive directory, including all telephone subscribers. Second, this directory should be available to all users. Building a simple theoretical model, inspired by the literature on two-sided markets, we find that one of these two obligations is redundant. Imposing availability to all users is sufficient to induce pub...
1 CitationsSource
#1Dries De Smet (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)H-Index: 2
#2Patrick Van Cayseele (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)H-Index: 8
Both sides of a two-sided market are usually modeled as markets without product differentiation. Often however,it will be profit maximizing to differentiate one or two sides in two or more types. In a simple theoretical model,inspired by Yellow Pages,we show that this decision crucially depends on the appreciation of these differentiated types by the other side. We argue that this consists of two parts: first, a preference for informative advertisement by users and second, the effect of persuasi...
2 CitationsSource