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James M. Walker
Indiana University
103Publications
43H-index
10.3kCitations
Publications 103
Newest
Abstract Newly arrived pests and diseases pose a continuous threat to agriculture and the environment, and there are limited resources available for early detection programs. We formulate an optimal resource-allocation framework for early detection. The approach is based on the principles of portfolio theory although, unlike standard portfolio theory and its previous applications to biosecurity problems, return is modelled using a flexible mixed-distribution and an uncertainty measure is defined...
#1Abhijit Ramalingam (ASU: Appalachian State University)H-Index: 5
#2Brock Stoddard (ASU: Appalachian State University)H-Index: 5
Last.James M. Walker (IU: Indiana University Bloomington)H-Index: 43
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In a laboratory setting, we investigate the effect of competition for the resources of team members with ‘divided loyalties’, and the role of such competition in overcoming the free-rider problem associated with the provision of team-level public goods. We find that competition alone creates ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. However, if groups have access to more information on the actions of team members, or are able to determine their membership through ostracism, they are more successful in attracting ...
#1Abhijit Ramalingam (UEA: University of East Anglia)H-Index: 5
#2Antonio J. Morales (UMA: University of Málaga)H-Index: 6
Last.James M. Walker (IU: Indiana University)H-Index: 43
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We provide evidence that more explicit instructions can affect behaviour in a public goods game with punishment. Instructions that highlight the positive externality associated with public goods contributions and provide more examples improve subjects’ comprehension levels, as measured by shorter decision times in the experiment. They also lead to higher contribution levels in games with punishment opportunities, linked to better targeting of punishment.
#1Abhijit RamalingamH-Index: 5
#2Antonio J. MoralesH-Index: 6
Last.James M. WalkerH-Index: 43
view all 3 authors...
This study brings together two strands of experimental literature, “Give and Take” versions of strategically and payoff isomorphic linear public goods games and the effectiveness of peer punishment in promoting cooperation in repeated fixed-group game settings. We find evidence of lower cooperation in the Take game setting, primarily due to a greater decrease in cooperation in later decision rounds. Importantly, we also find that peer punishment is able to overcome the decrease in cooperation in...
#1Esther Blanco (IU: Indiana University)H-Index: 8
#2Tobias Haller (University of Innsbruck)H-Index: 3
Last.James M. Walker (IU: Indiana University)H-Index: 43
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Using an appropriation game setting, we examine individual responses to changes in a groups’ vulnerability to a probabilistic loss (L) of a public good. The probabilistic loss parameter entails losing 10, 50 or 90% of the value of the public good that is maintained through cooperation, where the likelihood of the loss decreases in total group cooperation. By design, the expected marginal net benefits to an individual and the expected harm to others depends endogenously on the individuals’ expect...
#1Esther Blanco (IU: Indiana University)H-Index: 8
#2Tobias Haller (University of Innsbruck)H-Index: 3
Last.James M. Walker (IU: Indiana University)H-Index: 43
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Abstract Public goods often provide external benefits to individuals beyond those who actively provide the goods. This paper addresses institutional arrangements between subjects who can provide a public good (insiders) and subjects who also benefit from the public good but cannot provide it (outsiders) due to technical, physical or institutional reasons. Using laboratory experiments, we compare a setting of passive outsiders to situations where outsiders can either make unconditional or conditi...
#1Volodymyr Lugovskyy (IU: Indiana University Bloomington)H-Index: 7
#2Daniela Puzzello (IU: Indiana University Bloomington)H-Index: 10
Last.Arlington W. Williams (IU: Indiana University Bloomington)H-Index: 28
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A growing literature in experimental economics examines the conditions under which cooperation can be sustained in social-dilemma settings. In particular, several recent studies contrast cooperation levels in games in which the number of decision rounds is probabilistic to games in which the number of decision rounds is finite. We contribute to this literature by contrasting the evolution of cooperation in probabilistically and finitely repeated linear voluntary-contribution public-goods games (...
#1Abhijit Ramalingam (UEA: University of East Anglia)H-Index: 5
#2Sara Godoy (UEA: University of East Anglia)H-Index: 1
Last.James M. Walker (IU: Indiana University Bloomington)H-Index: 43
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In a repeated public goods setting, we explore whether individuals, acting unilaterally, will provide an effective sanctioning institution. Subjects first choose independently whether they will participate in a sanctioning stage that follows a contribution stage. Only those who gave themselves the “right” to sanction can do so. We find that the effectiveness of the institution may not require provision of the institution at the level of the group. Individuals acting unilaterally are able to prov...
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