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Eyal Winter
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Mathematical economicsEconomicsMicroeconomicsShapley valueWelfare economics
92Publications
27H-index
1,920Citations
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Publications 93
Newest
#1Moshe HavivH-Index: 23
Last. Eyal Winter (HUJI: Hebrew University of Jerusalem)H-Index: 27
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We derive a revenue-maximizing scheme that charges customers who are homogeneous with respect to their waiting cost parameter for a random fee in order to become premium customers. This scheme incentivizes all customers to purchase priority, each at his/her drawn price. We also design a revenue-maximizing scheme for the case where customers are heterogeneous with respect to their waiting cost parameter. Now lower cost parameter customers are encouraged to join the premium class at a low price: G...
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#1Yuval Heller (BIU: Bar-Ilan University)H-Index: 6
#2Eyal Winter (Lancaster University)H-Index: 27
1 CitationsSource
#1Marina HalacH-Index: 9
#2Ilan KremerH-Index: 17
Last. Eyal WinterH-Index: 27
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A rm raises capital from multiple investors to fund a project. The project succeeds only if the capital raised exceeds a stochastic threshold, and the rm offers payments contingent on success. We study the rm's optimal unique-implementation scheme, namely the scheme that guarantees the rm the maximum payoff. This scheme pays investors differential net returns (per unit of capital) depending on the size of their investments. We show that if the distribution of the investment threshold is log-conc...
#1Abigail HurwitzH-Index: 1
#2Orly SadeH-Index: 8
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#1Salomon Israel (HUJI: Hebrew University of Jerusalem)H-Index: 28
#2Boaz Cherki (HUJI: Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Last. David MankutaH-Index: 27
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#1Esteban F. Klor (HUJI: Hebrew University of Jerusalem)H-Index: 14
#2Eyal Winter (HUJI: Hebrew University of Jerusalem)H-Index: 27
This paper studies the effects that the revelation of information on the electorate's preferences has on voters' turnout decisions. The experimental data show that closeness in the division of preferences induces a significant increase in turnout. Moreover, for closely divided electorates (and only for these electorates) the provision of information significantly raises the participation of subjects supporting the slightly larger team relative to the smaller team. This behaviour contradicts the ...
10 CitationsSource
#1Eyal Winter (University of Leicester)H-Index: 27
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#1Eyal Winter (HUJI: Hebrew University of Jerusalem)H-Index: 27
#2Luciano Méndez-Naya (University of Santiago de Compostela)H-Index: 4
Last. Ignacio García Jurado (University of A Coruña)H-Index: 15
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We model mental states as part of an equilibrium notion. In a mental equilibrium each player “selects” an emotional state that determines the player’s preferences over the outcomes of the game. These preferences typically differ from the players’ material preferences. The emotional states interact to play a Nash equilibrium and, in addition, each player’s mental state must be a best response to the mental states of the others (in the sense of maximizing material payoffs). We discuss the concept ...
3 CitationsSource
Corporate entities enjoy legal subjectivity in a variety of forms, but they are not human beings, and hence their legal capacity to bear rights and obligations of their own is not universal. This paper explores, from a normative point of view, one of the limits that ought to be set on the capacity of corporations to act "as if" they had a human nature, their capacity to commit crime. Accepted wisdom has it that corporate criminal liability is justified as a measure to deter criminal behavior. Ou...
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