Shuo Zeng
California State Polytechnic University, Pomona
Data miningEconomicsPrincipal–agent problemComputer scienceSocial media
17Publications
8H-index
207Citations
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Publications 17
#1Xun Xu (California State University, Stanislaus)H-Index: 3
#1Xun Xu (California State University, Stanislaus)H-Index: 11
Last. Yuanjie He (CPP: California State Polytechnic University, Pomona)H-Index: 10
view all 3 authors...
Abstract Via the empirical evidences from Airbnb from eight major cities in U.S., we examine the role of information disclosure in influencing consumers' purchase behavior on this sharing economy platform. We analyze information disclosure from four aspects – namely, what information (i.e., information content), from where (i.e., information source), in what format (information presentation format), and how much (the quantity of information). We find all three information sources – providers, pl...
#1Shuo Zeng (CPP: California State Polytechnic University, Pomona)H-Index: 8
#2Moshe Dror (UA: University of Arizona)H-Index: 36
While there is vast literature on principal-agent service contracts in which a principal pools the service capacities of multiple agents for economy of scale, here we focus on the case that exists in practice of an agent pooling multiple principals. Since it is reasonable to presume that an agent of good standing attracts multiple contract offers, his main strategic decision is to select his principals. It is generally known that a principal can extract all economic surplus from a risk-neutral a...
#1Xun Xu (California State University, Stanislaus)H-Index: 11
#1Xun Xu (California State University, Stanislaus)H-Index: 3
Last. Yuanjie He (CPP: California State Polytechnic University, Pomona)H-Index: 10
view all 3 authors...
Remarketing and reselling remanufactured electronic products is one of the effective and sustainable approaches to deal with the rapidly increasing e-waste. Studying customer purchasing intention and behavior toward remanufactured products can help businesses better understand customers’ needs and improve closed-loop supply chain performance. Via an empirical study based on new, manufacturer remanufactured, seller remanufactured, and used products transaction data from eBay, one of the most popu...
#1Xun Xu (California State University, Stanislaus)H-Index: 11
#1Xun Xu (California State University, Stanislaus)H-Index: 3
Last. Shuo Zeng (CPP: California State Polytechnic University, Pomona)H-Index: 8
view all 3 authors...
With the rapid growth of online shopping, online sellers are facing more sales opportunities and challenges in the highly-competitive e-commerce market. Sellers that can generate high customer cumulative ratings may experience higher demand and profits. We explore the question of how sellers can attain those high ratings. Using leading online shopping websites in China and the U.S., we collected data for 200 online sellers in both countries for each of 40 product categories (16,000 observations)...
#1Shuo Zeng (UA: University of Arizona)H-Index: 8
#2Moshe Dror (UA: University of Arizona)H-Index: 36
In a basic principal-agent setting, the principal contracts an agent to perform a service function and the agent chooses the level of his capacity (his ‘effort’) in response to the contract offer and subsequently its effect on the principal’s revenue stream. We assume that the principal’s equipment unit generates revenue at an expected rate of r > 0 \$ per unit of uptime. The unit runs for a random period of time before failing, and remains in the failed state until it is repaired. To address the...
#1Shuo Zeng (UA: University of Arizona)H-Index: 8
#2Moshe Dror (UA: University of Arizona)H-Index: 36
When a risk-neutral agent accepts a contract offer (w, p), his expected utility rate is composed of the expected value of the compensation rate from the principal and a deterministic cost rate of the service capacity which can be expressed as $$w - pP(1)-\mu$$, where P(1) denotes the steady state probability of the unit being in the failed state. Similarly denote the steady state probability of the unit being operational by $$P(0) = 1 - P(1)$$.
#1Shuo Zeng (UA: University of Arizona)H-Index: 8
#2Moshe Dror (UA: University of Arizona)H-Index: 36
What if the agent is risk-averse. Fluctuations of the agent’s revenue stream occur because the principal’s equipment unit can be either in state 0 (‘operational’) or in state 1 (‘down’). In the operational state the penalty rate is 0, whereas in the down state the penalty rate is p. In other words, the penalty rate at any point of time can be modeled as pB where B is a Bernoulli random variable of value 0 with probability $$P(0) =\mu /(\lambda +\mu )$$ and value 1 with probability \(P(1) =\lambd...
#1Shuo Zeng (UA: University of Arizona)H-Index: 8
#2Moshe Dror (UA: University of Arizona)H-Index: 36
In previous section we represented agent’s perceived risk by a measure that reflects the dispersion of his revenue stream. Although the dispersion of possible outcomes has been widely used as the measure of risk (Pratt 1964; Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970; Stiglitz 1974; Levy 1992; Fukunaga and Huffman 2009; Lewis and Bajari 2014) it fails to capture observable behavior in risky settings. In this section we extend our principal-agent analysis to risk-seeking agent. We note that there is an ongoing...
#1Shuo Zeng (UA: University of Arizona)H-Index: 8
#2Moshe DrorH-Index: 36
This book examines contractual options for a performance based contract between an owner of a revenue generating unit and a repair agent for such unit. The framework of the analysis is that of economists' principal-agent problem. The contractual options of a principal and an agent are modeled as a Markov process with an undetermined time horizon. For a risk neutral principal, the authors identify the conditions under which a principal contracts with a risk-neutral, risk-averse, or risk-seeking a...
#1Shuo ZengH-Index: 8
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