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Kebing Chen
Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics
4Publications
3H-index
41Citations
Publications 4
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#1Kebing Chen (NUAA: Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics)H-Index: 3
#2Hongmei Zhao (NUAA: Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics)
Last.Tiaojun Xiao (Nanjing University of Finance and Economics)H-Index: 19
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Abstract We consider a supply chain in which a manufacturer with random yield sells the product through a retailer, where the overflowed order of the retailer may be fulfilled by the manufacturer’s outsourcing product. The inherent uncertainties include demand uncertainty, yield uncertainty, and outsourcing information asymmetry. Two contingent outsourcing contracts are studied based on whether the delivery lead-time quotation is adopted or not. We study how the two outsourcing contracts affect ...
#1Kebing Chen (NUAA: Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics)H-Index: 3
#2Tiaojun Xiao (NU: Nanjing University)H-Index: 19
We study pricing and replenishment policies for a supply chain with multiple competing retailers.Both retail-competition and retail-cooperation models for a supply chain are considered.Retail cooperation is not stable and replenishment decision is largely affected by game scenario.A Groves wholesale price contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain.Coordination mechanism includes discount, competitive impact, and revenue regulator components. This paper develops game models for a two-ech...
#1Kebing Chen (NUAA: Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics)H-Index: 3
#2Jiulong Shen (NUAA: Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics)H-Index: 1
Last.Meiling Feng (NUAA: Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics)H-Index: 1
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We investigate the feasibility of coordination mechanism for two possible disruption(s) situations.When the inventory-cost disruption level is larger than a certain threshold, both players achieve win-win.The inventory-subsidy contract for disruption(s) situation has its rationality and limitation.Both disruption situations have their own robust scales.Some counter-intuitive managerial insights can be observed in the robust scale. This paper introduces a game model of one manufacturer and one re...
#1Kebing Chen (NUAA: Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics)H-Index: 3
#2Pin Zhuang (NUAA: Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics)H-Index: 1
In this paper, we consider coordination model of a one-manufacturer and multi-retailer supply chain with a dominant retailer's sales promotion opportunity and possible demand disruption. An appropriate contractual scheme can be used to fully coordinate the supply chain even if the demand disruption occurs. In our study, we also analyze how the demand disruption affects the coordination mechanism. When the demand is disrupted, the manufacturer only needs to adjust the maximum variable wholesale p...
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