James G. Combs
University of Alabama
Publications 72
Researchers recently pointed to family science as one avenue for better understanding business families. We submit, however, that leveraging family science will require building on what researchers...
#1James G. Combs (College of Business Administration)H-Index: 33
#2Peter Jaskiewicz (U of O: University of Ottawa)H-Index: 15
Last.David B. Balkin (CU: University of Colorado Boulder)H-Index: 34
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Abstract Family business researchers have felt increasing distress with the lack of understanding about how families – i.e., their structure, relationships, emotions, and goals – shape how families manage family firms, leading to calls to more fully incorporate “family science” theories about the nature of family into research about family firms. It seems likely that families' first impact in family firms will be on how employees are treated and managed. Thus, this special issue brings together ...
9 CitationsSource
#1Gary N. Powell (UConn: University of Connecticut)H-Index: 45
#2Jeffrey H. Greenhaus (Drexel University)H-Index: 51
Last.Kristen K. Shanine (MT: Middle Tennessee State University)H-Index: 2
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2 CitationsSource
#1Michelle L. Zorn (AU: Auburn University)H-Index: 4
#2Christine Shropshire (ASU: Arizona State University)H-Index: 8
Last.David J. Ketchen (AU: Auburn University)H-Index: 56
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Research summary: Corporate scandals of the previous decade have heightened attention on board independence. Indeed, boards at many large firms are now so independent that the CEO is “home alone” as the lone inside member. We build upon “pro-insider” research within agency theory to explain how the growing trend toward lone-insider boards affects key outcomes and how external governance forces constrain their impact. We find evidence among S&P 1500 firms that having a lone-insider board is assoc...
8 CitationsSource
#1Peter Jaskiewicz (Concordia University)H-Index: 15
#2Joern H. Block (University of Trier)H-Index: 31
Last.James G. Combs (UA: University of Alabama)H-Index: 33
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Emerging evidence suggests that pay dispersion among non-CEO top management team (TMT) members harms firm performance, which raises questions about why firms’ owners tolerate or even support it. Prior research shows that the key distinction between founder and family owners is that in addition to firm performance and growth goals, family owners pursue socioemotional goals. On the basis of this distinction, we develop and test theory linking founders’ and families’ ownership to TMT pay dispersion...
14 CitationsSource
#1David J. Ketchen (AU: Auburn University)H-Index: 18
#2T. Russell Crook (College of Business Administration)H-Index: 20
Last.David J. Woehr (UNCC: University of North Carolina at Charlotte)H-Index: 29
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#1Peter Jaskiewicz (CUW: Concordia University Wisconsin)H-Index: 15
#2Joern H. Block (EUR: Erasmus University Rotterdam)H-Index: 31
Last.Danny Miller (U of A: University of Alberta)H-Index: 133
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Although large owners monitor managers effectively, they differ in important ways. Whereas founder owners focus on firm performance, family owners also pursue socioemotional goals. We leverage this distinction to theorize that family owners offer hired CEOs more incentive pay—to attract nonfamily CEOs, signal good governance, and achieve better firm performance. Without socioemotional wealth distractions, founder owners do not need high incentives and overusing them is counterproductive. Bayesia...
11 CitationsSource
5 CitationsSource