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Joshua R. Yoder
EconomicsMicroeconomicsMiscanthusEnergy cropContract theory
3Publications
2H-index
35Citations
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Publications 3
Newest
#1Joshua R. YoderH-Index: 2
#2Corinne E. Alexander (Purdue University)H-Index: 13
Last. Steven Y. Wu (Purdue University)H-Index: 10
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We evaluate how different contract designs impact risk sharing along the supply chain for the dedicated energy crop miscanthus. We model the full production and transportation system of the miscanthus supply chain because a sustainable supply chain must procure biomass in a cost-effective manner. Using this model, we estimate the financial returns and risks for both a farmer producing miscanthus and the biofuels plant purchasing miscanthus. We evaluate differences among contracts that are design...
6 CitationsSource
#1Corinne E. Alexander (AAEA: Agricultural & Applied Economics Association)H-Index: 13
#2Rastislav Ivanic (Mendel Biotechnology, Inc.)H-Index: 2
Last. Joshua R. YoderH-Index: 2
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This article provides an overview of modern contract theory and discusses the implications of the theory for contracting for perennial dedicated energy crops. We discuss some of the unique challenges of contracting for dedicated energy crops used for the production of advanced biofuels and survey some of the relevant concepts and research from the contract theory literature to address these challenges. We focus primarily on the “mechanism design” or “complete contracts” approach to contracting, ...
29 CitationsSource
#1Steven Y. WuH-Index: 10
#2Stephanie D. Rosch (Purdue University)H-Index: 3
Last. Joshua R. YoderH-Index: 2
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We present designs for optimal contracts to solve the investment hold-up problem for perennial crops for the biofuel industry. A fixed-price contract is ex-ante efficient but renegotiation-proof for a limited range of discount parameters. A perfectly- indexed contract is both renegotiation-proof and ex-post efficient. Provided long-run land prices are stationary, the expected cost for both contracts converges to the long-run expected price of land for a risk-neutral farmer.
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