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Christoph Hauert
University of British Columbia
Public goodGame theorySocial dilemmaPopulationBiology
94Publications
44H-index
11kCitations
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Publications 88
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#1Paul Ibbotson (OU: Open University)H-Index: 7
#2Christoph Hauert (UBC: University of British Columbia)H-Index: 44
Last. Richard Walker (OU: Open University)H-Index: 1
view all 3 authors...
Recent research on the conditions that facilitate cooperation is limited by a factor that has yet to be established: the accuracy of effort perception. Accuracy matters because the fitness of cooperative strategies depends not just on being able to perceive others’ effort but to perceive their true effort. In an experiment using a novel effort-tracker methodology, we calculate the accuracy of human effort perceptions and show that accuracy is boosted by more absolute effort (regardless of relati...
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#1Shahab Zareyan (UBC: University of British Columbia)H-Index: 2
#2Sarah P. Otto (UBC: University of British Columbia)H-Index: 63
Last. Christoph Hauert (UBC: University of British Columbia)H-Index: 44
view all 3 authors...
In an evolutionary context, trusted signals or cues provide individuals with the opportunity to manipulate them to their advantage by deceiving others. The deceived can then respond to the deceptio...
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#1Felix Funk (UBC: University of British Columbia)H-Index: 1
#2Christoph Hauert (UBC: University of British Columbia)H-Index: 44
From the microscopic to the macroscopic level, biological life exhibits directed migration in response to environmental conditions. Chemotaxis enables microbes to sense and move towards nutrient-rich regions or to avoid toxic ones. Socio-economic factors drive human populations from rural to urban areas. The effect of collective movement is especially significant when triggered in response to the generation of public goods. Microbial communities can, for instance, alter their environment through...
1 CitationsSource
#1Felix Funk (UBC: University of British Columbia)H-Index: 1
#2Christoph Hauert (UBC: University of British Columbia)H-Index: 44
From the microscopic to the macroscopic level, biological life exhibits directed migration in response to environmental conditions. Chemotaxis enables microbes to sense and move towards nutrient-rich regions or to avoid toxic ones. Socio-economic factors drive human populations from rural to urban areas. However, migration affects the quantity and quality of desirable resources. The effect of collective movement is especially significant when in response to the generation of public goods. Microb...
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#1Christoph Hauert (UBC: University of British Columbia)H-Index: 44
#2Camille Saade ('ENS Paris': École Normale Supérieure)H-Index: 1
Last. Alex McAvoy (Harvard University)H-Index: 9
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Abstract Models in evolutionary game theory traditionally assume symmetric interactions in homogeneous environments. Here, we consider populations evolving in a heterogeneous environment, which consists of patches of different qualities that are occupied by one individual each. The fitness of individuals is not only determined by interactions with others but also by environmental quality. This heterogeneity results in asymmetric interactions where the characteristics of the interaction may depen...
2 CitationsSource
The sampling of interaction partners depends on often implicit modelling assumptions, yet has marked effects on the dynamics in evolutionary games. One particularly important aspect is whether or not competitors also interact. Population structures naturally affect sampling such that in a microscopic interpretation of the replicator dynamics in well-mixed populations competing individuals do not interact but do interact in structured populations. In social dilemmas interactions with competitors ...
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#1Alex McAvoy (Harvard University)H-Index: 9
#2Nicolas Fraiman (UNC: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)H-Index: 6
Last. Michael A. Nowak (Harvard University)H-Index: 138
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Many mathematical frameworks of evolutionary game dynamics assume that the total population size is constant and that selection affects only the relative frequency of strategies. Here, we consider evolutionary game dynamics in an extended Wright–Fisher process with variable population size. In such a scenario, it is possible that the entire population becomes extinct. Survival of the population may depend on which strategy prevails in the game dynamics. Studying cooperative dilemmas, it is a n...
18 CitationsSource
#1Alex McAvoy (Harvard University)H-Index: 9
#2Christoph Hauert (UBC: University of British Columbia)H-Index: 44
Repeated games have a long tradition in the behavioral sciences and evolutionary biology. Recently, strategies were discovered that permit an unprecedented level of control over repeated interactions by enabling a player to unilaterally enforce linear constraints on payoffs. Here, we extend this theory of “zero-determinant†(or, more generally, “autocratic†) strategies to alternating games, which are often biologically more relevant than traditional synchronous games. Alternating games na...
9 CitationsSource
#1Chaitanya S. Gokhale (MPG: Max Planck Society)H-Index: 16
#2Christoph Hauert (UBC: University of British Columbia)H-Index: 44
Social dilemmas are an integral part of social interactions. Cooperative actions, ranging from secreting extra-cellular products in microbial populations to donating blood in humans, are costly to the actor and hence create an incentive to shirk and avoid the costs. Nevertheless, cooperation is ubiquitous in nature. Both costs and benefits often depend non-linearly on the number and types of individuals involved—as captured by idioms such as ‘too many cooks spoil the broth’ where additiona...
26 CitationsSource
#1Alex McAvoy (UBC: University of British Columbia)H-Index: 9
#2Christoph Hauert (UBC: University of British Columbia)H-Index: 44
Abstract The recent discovery of zero-determinant strategies for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma sparked a surge of interest in the surprising fact that a player can exert unilateral control over iterated interactions. These remarkable strategies, however, are known to exist only in games in which players choose between two alternative actions such as “cooperate” and “defect.” Here we introduce a broader class of autocratic strategies by extending zero-determinant strategies to iterated games wi...
15 CitationsSource
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