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Jordi Brandts
Spanish National Research Council
127Publications
29H-index
3,767Citations
Publications 128
Newest
Abstract Competition involves two dimensions, rivalry for resources and social-status ranking. In our experiment we exclude the first dimension and investigate gender differences in the preference for status ranking. Participants perform a task under non-rivalry incentives. Before doing so, individuals indicate whether they prefer to do the task in an environment with social-status ranking or one without, knowing whether or not the choice will be imposed upon the whole group (as opposed to being...
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#1Jordi Brandts (CSIC: Spanish National Research Council)H-Index: 29
#2Arno Riedl (UM: Maastricht University)H-Index: 28
We experimentally study the causal effects of different types of market experience on the efficiency levels attained in a subsequent social dilemma. Our motivation stems from the existence of contrasting views on the potential spillover effects of participation in markets on non-market activities requiring cooperation. In our setup, market interaction takes place in a competitive market involving a short and a long side. Our focus is on the comparison of the efficiency levels attained in a subse...
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#1Jordi Brandts (Barcelona Graduate School of Economics)H-Index: 29
#2José M. Ortiz (Middlesex University)
Last.Carles Solà Belda (CUNY: City University of New York)H-Index: 1
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Distributional Concerns in Managers’ Compensation Schemes for Heterogeneous Workers: Experimental Evidence
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#1Arthur SchramH-Index: 26
#2Jordi Brandts (Barcelona Graduate School of Economics)H-Index: 29
Last.Klarita Gërxhani (EUI: European University Institute)H-Index: 13
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Competition involves two main dimensions, a rivalry for resources and the ranking of relative performance. If socially recognized, the latter yields a ranking in terms of social status. The rivalry for resources resulting from competitive incentives has been found to negatively affect women’s performance relative to that of men. However, little is known about gender differences in the performance consequences of social-status ranking. In our experiments we introduce a novel design that allows us...
3 CitationsSource
#1Jordi BrandtsH-Index: 29
#2Isabel BusomH-Index: 8
Last.Judith PanadésH-Index: 1
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False beliefs about natural, health and socio-economic issues are pervasive in society. Many persist even when contradicted by scientific evidence. We conduct a classroom field and a laboratory experiment to investigate the effect of a particular communication strategy, the refutation text, previously used in the natural sciences and psychology, on a widespread economic misconception: the belief that rent controls make housing available to more people. Our interests are in successfully communica...
#1Jordi Brandts (CSIC: Spanish National Research Council)H-Index: 29
#2David J. Cooper (FSU: Florida State University)H-Index: 26
Last.Christina RottH-Index: 2
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#1Jordi BrandtsH-Index: 29
#2Brice CorgnetH-Index: 12
Last.Carles Solà BeldaH-Index: 1
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We study the incentive effect of firing threats when bosses have limited information about workers. We show that a minimal amount of individual information about workers’ effort such as the time spent at their work station is sufficient to ensure strong incentive effects. This supports the use of firing threats based on rudimentary yet uncontroversial measures of work performance such as absenteeism, in organizational settings in which only limited information about workers is available. Our res...
#1Jordi Brandts (Barcelona Graduate School of Economics)H-Index: 29
#2Jan PottersH-Index: 25
This second volume of the Handbook includes original contribution by experts in the field. It provides up-to-date surveys of the most relevant applications of game theory to industrial organization. The book covers both classical as well as new IO topics such as mergers in markets with homogeneous and differentiated goods, leniency and coordinated effects in cartels and mergers, static and dynamic contests, consumer search and product safety, strategic delegation, platforms and network effects, ...
1 CitationsSource
#1Jordi BrandtsH-Index: 29
#2David J. CooperH-Index: 26
We study the tradeoffs between centralized and decentralized management using a new experimental game, the decentralization game. Product types for two divisions are either chosen independently by the divisions (decentralization) or imposed by a central manager (centralization). Centralization makes it easier to coordinate the divisions’ product types but more difficult to take advantage of the divisions’ private information. We find that total surplus is highest when centralization is combined ...
1 Citations
#1Jordi BrandtsH-Index: 29
#2Klarita GërxhaniH-Index: 13
Last.Arthur SchramH-Index: 26
view all 3 authors...
Competition involves two dimensions, rivalry for resources and social-status ranking. In our experiment we exclude the first dimension and investigate gender differences in the preference for status ranking. Participants perform a task under non-rivalry incentives. Before doing so, individuals indicate whether they prefer to do the task in an environment with social-status ranking or one without, knowing whether or not the choice will be imposed upon the whole group (as opposed to being personal...
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