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Roman M. Sheremeta
Case Western Reserve University
122Publications
34H-index
3,639Citations
Publications 122
Newest
#1Michael Majerczyk (J. Mack Robinson College of Business)H-Index: 1
#2Roman M. Sheremeta (Case Western Reserve University)H-Index: 34
Last.Yu Tian (UCF: University of Central Florida)H-Index: 1
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We examine theoretically and experimentally how combining between-team and within-team incentives affects behavior in team tournaments. Theory predicts that free-riding is likely to occur when there are only between-team incentives, and offering within-team incentives may solve this problem. However, if individuals collude, then within-team incentives may not be as effective at reducing free-riding. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, the results of our experiment indicate that although...
1 CitationsSource
#1Dan Kovenock (CES: Center for Economic Studies)H-Index: 30
#2Brian Roberson (Purdue University)H-Index: 12
Last.Roman M. Sheremeta (Chapman University)H-Index: 34
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This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker’s objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender’s objective is diametrically opposed. We apply two benchmark contest success functions (CSFs): the auction CSF and the lottery CSF. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, under the auction CSF, attackers utilize a stochastic “guerilla warfare” strategy — in which a single ...
57 CitationsSource
#1Shakun D. Mago (UR: University of Richmond)H-Index: 9
#2Roman M. Sheremeta (Case Western Reserve University)H-Index: 34
Sequential multi-battle contests are predicted to induce lower expenditure than simultaneous contests. This prediction is a result of a “New Hampshire Effect” – a strategic advantage created by the winner of the first battle. Although our laboratory study provides evidence for the New Hampshire Effect, we find that sequential contests generate significantly higher (not lower) expenditure than simultaneous contests. This is mainly because in sequential contests, there is significant over-expendit...
3 CitationsSource
#1Cary Deck (UA: University of Alabama)H-Index: 25
#2Roman M. Sheremeta (Case Western Reserve University)H-Index: 34
The tug-of-war is a multi-battle contest often used to describe extended interactions in economics, operations management, political science, and other disciplines. While there has been some theoretical work, to the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first experimental study of the tug-of-war. The results show notable deviations of behavior from theory derived under standard assumptions. In the first battle of the tug-of-war, subjects often bid less, while in the follow-up battles, t...
Source
#1Erik O. Kimbroughy (Chapman University)H-Index: 14
#2Roman M. Sheremeta (Case Western Reserve University)H-Index: 34
Abstract The special issue aims to bring together different perspectives on conflict and war from different disciplines, including economics, psychology, evolutionary biology, anthropology, political science, and management. By collecting these distinct, but overlapping perspectives in a single issue, we hope to encourage interdisciplinary work on conflict and war.
1 CitationsSource
#1David Clingingsmith (Case Western Reserve University)H-Index: 5
#2Roman M. Sheremeta (Case Western Reserve University)H-Index: 34
Some economists argue that consumption of publicly visible goods is driven by social status. Making a causal inference about this claim is difficult with observational data. We conduct an experiment in which we vary both whether a purchase of a physical product is publicly visible or kept private and whether the income used for purchase is linked to social status or randomly assigned. Making consumption choices visible leads to a large increase in demand when income is linked to status, but not ...
4 CitationsSource
#1Matthew W. McCarterH-Index: 13
Last.Roman M. SheremetaH-Index: 34
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In their article about why supply chain alliances struggle to create value, McCarter and Northcraft (2007) observe that, as a collective action, supply chain alliances are social dilemmas, and McCa...
Source
#1Roman M. Sheremeta (Case Western Reserve University)H-Index: 34
7 CitationsSource
#1Thomas A. Rietz (UI: University of Iowa)H-Index: 21
#2Eric Schniter (Chapman University)H-Index: 13
Last.Timothy W. Shields (Chapman University)H-Index: 12
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In the absence of enforceable contracts, many economic and personal interactions rely on trust and reciprocity. Research shows that although this reliance often works well, sometimes it breaks down. Simple rules mandating minimum standards on reciprocation prevent the most egregious trust violations, but may also undermine behavior that would have otherwise produced higher overall economic welfare. We test the efficacy of exogenously imposed minimum return rules using experimental trust games. W...
27 CitationsSource
#1Jared Rubin (Chapman University)H-Index: 13
#2Anya Savikhin (SC: University of Southern California)H-Index: 15
Last.Roman M. Sheremeta (Case Western Reserve University)H-Index: 34
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Firms face an optimization problem that requires a maximal quantity output given a quality constraint. But how do firms incentivize quantity and quality to meet these dual goals, and what role do behavioral factors, such as loss aversion, play in the tradeoffs workers face? We address these questions with a theoretical model and an experiment in which participants are paid for both quantity and quality of a real effort task. Consistent with basic economic theory, higher quality incentives encour...
5 CitationsSource
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