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Duncan Snidal
University of Oxford
81Publications
26H-index
5,844Citations
Publications 81
Newest
2019 in Regulation & Governance [IF: 2.73]
Kenneth W. Abbott24
Estimated H-index: 24
(Arizona State University),
Philipp Genschel15
Estimated H-index: 15
(European University Institute),
Duncan Snidal26
Estimated H-index: 26
(University of Oxford)
... more
Source Cite
Kenneth W. Abbott24
Estimated H-index: 24
,
Philipp Genschel15
Estimated H-index: 15
,
Duncan Snidal26
Estimated H-index: 26
... more
No governor has sufficient capabilities to govern single-handedly; all governors rely on agents, and thus become principals. The "governor's dilemma" results from the tradeoff between agent competence and principal control. Competent agents are difficult to control because their policy contributions give them leverage over the principal; principal control impedes agent competence by constraining the development and exercise of agent capabilities. If a principal emphasizes control, it limits agen...
Source
Karolina Milewicz5
Estimated H-index: 5
(University of Oxford),
James Hollway5
Estimated H-index: 5
(Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies),
Claire Peacock1
Estimated H-index: 1
(University of Oxford)
... more
Increased complexity and density of transnational problems create unprecedented challenges and opportunities for contemporary international governance. “Issue linkage” is one institutional arrangement through which states address these changing circumstances. In this article, we examine the widening scope of the nontrade agenda in preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Nontrade issues (NTIs) such as human rights, democracy, environment, corruption, and labor standards are increasingly linked to P...
10 Citations Source Cite
Kenneth W. Abbott24
Estimated H-index: 24
(Arizona State University),
David Levi-Faur27
Estimated H-index: 27
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem),
Duncan Snidal26
Estimated H-index: 26
(University of Oxford)
9 Citations Source Cite
Kenneth W. Abbott24
Estimated H-index: 24
(Arizona State University),
David Levi-Faur27
Estimated H-index: 27
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem),
Duncan Snidal26
Estimated H-index: 26
(University of Oxford)
Regulation is typically conceived as a two-party relationship between a rule-maker or regulator (R) and a rule-taker or target (T). We set out an agenda for the study of regulation as a three- (or more) party relationship, with intermediaries (I) at the center of the analysis. Intermediaries play major and varied roles in regulation, from providing expertise and feedback to facilitating implementation, from monitoring the behavior of regulatory targets to building communities of assurance and tr...
17 Citations Source Cite
Kenneth W. Abbott24
Estimated H-index: 24
(Arizona State University),
David Levi-Faur27
Estimated H-index: 27
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem),
Duncan Snidal26
Estimated H-index: 26
(University of Oxford)
Regulation should be theorized as a three-party relationship (RIT), with intermediaries (I) playing diverse roles between the regulator (R) and the targets of regulation (T). Here we summarize and assess extensions of the basic RIT model introduced in the volume, including changes in regulatory relationships over time, chains of regulatory actors, and networks. We also draw lessons for regulatory policy from the volume as a whole, emphasizing the diverse goals that intermediaries pursue; the imp...
4 Citations Source Cite
Joseph Jupille8
Estimated H-index: 8
,
Walter Mattli12
Estimated H-index: 12
,
Duncan Snidal26
Estimated H-index: 26
Cite
2016 in International Organization [IF: 4.52]
Karolina Milewicz5
Estimated H-index: 5
,
Duncan Snidal26
Estimated H-index: 26
1 Citations Source Cite
Kenneth W. Abbott24
Estimated H-index: 24
(Arizona State University),
Philipp Genschel15
Estimated H-index: 15
(European University Institute),
Duncan Snidal26
Estimated H-index: 26
(University of Oxford)
... more
This article introduces the concept of orchestration as the mobilization of an intermediary by an orchestrator on a voluntary basis in pursuit of a joint governance goal. Orchestrator-Intermediary theory then provides a model of indirect governance that supplements delegation models premised on principal-agent theory. Under both theories, governors enhance their governance capacity by drawing on the capabilities of third parties. Whereas delegation is premised on hard ‘contractual’ control over ...
16 Citations Source Cite
Joseph Jupille8
Estimated H-index: 8
,
Walter Mattli12
Estimated H-index: 12
,
Duncan Snidal26
Estimated H-index: 26
Part I: 1. Introduction: institutional choice and global commerce 2. International institutional choice: cooperation, alternatives, and strategies 3. Building Theseus' ship: why the ITO failed, the GATT succeeded, and the WTO emerged Part II: 4. Creating the first international court of commercial dispute resolution: the Mixed Courts of Egypt 5. Commercial complexity and institutional choice in the GATT era 6. Institutional choice in global accounting governance Part III: 7. Conclusion: overview...
39 Citations Source
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