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Duncan Snidal
University of Oxford
83Publications
27H-index
6,180Citations
Publications 83
Newest
Published on Jan 4, 2019in Regulation & Governance 2.73
Kenneth W. Abbott26
Estimated H-index: 26
,
Philipp Genschel17
Estimated H-index: 17
(EUI: European University Institute)
+ 1 AuthorsBernhard Zangl3
Estimated H-index: 3
(LMU: Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich)
Most governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. Principal–agent theory views indirect governance primarily as a problem of information: the agent has an informational advantage over the principal, which it can exploit to evade principal control. But indirect governance creates a more fundamental problem of power. Competent intermediaries with needed expertise, credibility, legitimacy, and/or operational capacity are inherently difficult to control because the policy benefits the...
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Published on Apr 1, 2018in Journal of Conflict Resolution 3.49
Karolina Milewicz6
Estimated H-index: 6
(University of Oxford),
James Hollway6
Estimated H-index: 6
(HEI: Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies)
+ 1 AuthorsDuncan Snidal27
Estimated H-index: 27
(University of Oxford)
Increased complexity and density of transnational problems create unprecedented challenges and opportunities for contemporary international governance. “Issue linkage” is one institutional arrangement through which states address these changing circumstances. In this article, we examine the widening scope of the nontrade agenda in preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Nontrade issues (NTIs) such as human rights, democracy, environment, corruption, and labor standards are increasingly linked to P...
16 Citations Source Cite
Published on Jan 1, 2018
Kenneth W. Abbott26
Estimated H-index: 26
,
Philipp Genschel17
Estimated H-index: 17
+ 1 AuthorsBernhard Zangl3
Estimated H-index: 3
No governor has sufficient capabilities to govern single-handedly; all governors rely on agents, and thus become principals. The "governor's dilemma" results from the tradeoff between agent competence and principal control. Competent agents are difficult to control because their policy contributions give them leverage over the principal; principal control impedes agent competence by constraining the development and exercise of agent capabilities. If a principal emphasizes control, it limits agen...
Published on Mar 9, 2017
Joseph Jupille9
Estimated H-index: 9
,
Walter Mattli18
Estimated H-index: 18
,
Duncan Snidal27
Estimated H-index: 27
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Kenneth W. Abbott26
Estimated H-index: 26
(ASU: Arizona State University),
David Levi-Faur28
Estimated H-index: 28
(HUJI: Hebrew University of Jerusalem),
Duncan Snidal27
Estimated H-index: 27
(University of Oxford)
12 Citations Source Cite
Kenneth W. Abbott26
Estimated H-index: 26
(ASU: Arizona State University),
David Levi-Faur28
Estimated H-index: 28
(HUJI: Hebrew University of Jerusalem),
Duncan Snidal27
Estimated H-index: 27
(University of Oxford)
Regulation should be theorized as a three-party relationship (RIT), with intermediaries (I) playing diverse roles between the regulator (R) and the targets of regulation (T). Here we summarize and assess extensions of the basic RIT model introduced in the volume, including changes in regulatory relationships over time, chains of regulatory actors, and networks. We also draw lessons for regulatory policy from the volume as a whole, emphasizing the diverse goals that intermediaries pursue; the imp...
6 Citations Source Cite
Published on Oct 1, 2016in British Journal of Political Science 3.33
Kenneth W. Abbott26
Estimated H-index: 26
(ASU: Arizona State University),
Philipp Genschel17
Estimated H-index: 17
(EUI: European University Institute)
+ 1 AuthorsBernhard Zangl14
Estimated H-index: 14
(LMU: Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich)
This article introduces the concept of orchestration as the mobilization of an intermediary by an orchestrator on a voluntary basis in pursuit of a joint governance goal. Orchestrator-Intermediary theory then provides a model of indirect governance that supplements delegation models premised on principal-agent theory. Under both theories, governors enhance their governance capacity by drawing on the capabilities of third parties. Whereas delegation is premised on hard ‘contractual’ control over ...
21 Citations Source Cite
Published on Jan 1, 2016in International Organization 4.52
Karolina Milewicz6
Estimated H-index: 6
,
Duncan Snidal27
Estimated H-index: 27
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Published on Jun 1, 2015
Lora Anne Viola5
Estimated H-index: 5
(FU: Free University of Berlin),
Duncan Snidal27
Estimated H-index: 27
(University of Oxford),
Michael Zürn2
Estimated H-index: 2
(FU: Free University of Berlin)
2 Citations Source Cite
Published on Jan 1, 2015
Kenneth W. Abbott26
Estimated H-index: 26
,
Philipp Genschel17
Estimated H-index: 17
+ 1 AuthorsBernhard Zangl3
Estimated H-index: 3
Source Cite
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