David Pérez-Castrillo
Autonomous University of Barcelona
Publications 91
#1Albert Banal-Estañol (UPF: Pompeu Fabra University)H-Index: 11
#2Inés Macho Stadler (Autonomous University of Barcelona)H-Index: 20
Last.David Pérez-Castrillo (Autonomous University of Barcelona)H-Index: 23
view all 3 authors...
Abstract We analyze whether funding bodies are biased against diverse teams, which have often been linked to the production of transformative research. We develop a general framework that compares the drivers of success in the ex-ante grant decision process to the drivers of success in ex-post performance. We use our framework to systematically analyze the decisions of one of the major public funding organizations for scientific research worldwide, the UK's Engineering and Physical Sciences Rese...
#2Marilda SotomayorH-Index: 21
In the one-sided assignment game any two agents can form a partnership and decide how to share the surplus created. Thus, in this market, an outcome involves a matching and a vector of payoffs. Contrary to the two-sided assignment game, stable outcomes often fail to exist in the one-sided assignment game. We introduce the idea of conflict-free outcomes: they are individually rational outcomes where no matched agent can form a blocking pair with any other agent, neither matched nor unmatched. We ...
#1David Pérez-Castrillo (Autonomous University of Barcelona)H-Index: 23
#2Marilda Sotomayor (USP: University of São Paulo)H-Index: 21
The multiple partners game (Sotomayor, 1992) extends the assignment game to a matching model where the agents can have several partners, up to their quota, and the utilities are additively separable. The present work fills a gap in the literature of that game by studying the effects on agents' payoffs caused by the entrance of new agents in the market under both the cooperative and the competitive approaches. The results obtained have no parallel in the one-to-one assignment game.
#1Bing Guo (Charles III University of Madrid)H-Index: 2
#2David Pérez-Castrillo (Autonomous University of Barcelona)H-Index: 23
Last.Anna Toldrà-Simats (Charles III University of Madrid)H-Index: 1
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We study the effect of analyst coverage on firms’ innovation strategy and outcome. By considering three different channels that allow firms to innovate: internal RD however, this negative effect becomes not significant when firms’ in-house R&D spending and external innovation channels are taken into account. We find that more financial analysts encourage firms to make more efficient investments related to innovation, which increase their future patents and citations. We address endogeneity with ...
#1David Pérez-Castrillo (Autonomous University of Barcelona)H-Index: 23
#2Marilda Sotomayor (USP: University of São Paulo)H-Index: 21
Abstract We analyze the manipulability of competitive equilibrium allocation rules for the simplest many-to-many extension of Shapley and Shubik’s (Int J Game Theory 1:111–130, 1972) assignment game. First, we show that if an agent has a quota of one, then she does not have an incentive to manipulate any competitive equilibrium rule that gives her her most preferred competitive equilibrium payoff when she reports truthfully. In particular, this result extends to the one-to-many (respectively, ma...
#1Inés Macho Stadler (Autonomous University of Barcelona)H-Index: 20
#2David Pérez-Castrillo (Autonomous University of Barcelona)H-Index: 23
Last.David Wettstein (BGU: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)H-Index: 12
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We propose the “average approach,” where the worth of a coalition is a weighted average of its worth for different partitions of the players’ set, as a unifying method to extend values for characteristic function form games. Our method allows us to extend the equal division value, the equal surplus value, the consensus value, the e-egalitarian Shapley value, and the least-square family. For each of the first three extensions, we also provide an axiomatic characterization of a particular value fo...
#1David Pérez-Castrillo (Autonomous University of Barcelona)H-Index: 23
#2Marilda Sotomayor (USP: University of São Paulo)H-Index: 21
Abstract We analyze the two-stage games induced by competitive equilibrium rules for the buyer–seller market of Shapley and Shubik (Int J Game Theory 1:111–130, 1972). In these procedures, first sellers and then buyers report their valuation and the outcome is determined by a competitive equilibrium outcome for the market reported by the agents. We provide results concerning buyers and sellers’ equilibrium strategies. In particular, our results point out that, by playing first, sellers are able ...
We use a two-sided matching framework to analyze collaboration between heterogeneous academics and firms. We consider both horizontal and vertical characteristics—those related to affinity (e.g., preferences for a type of scientific research) and those related to ability (e.g., capacity to produce high-quality scientific output). We build a unique data set based on the teams of academics and firms that proposed research projects to the UK’s Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council. Our...
#1Inés Macho StadlerH-Index: 20
Last.David WettsteinH-Index: 12
view all 3 authors...
Shapley (1953a) formulates his proposal of a value for cooperative games with transferable utility in characteristic function form, that is, for games where the re- sources every group of players has available to distribute among its members only depend on the members of the group. However, the worth of a coalition of agents often depends on the organization of the rest of the players. The existence of exter- nalities is one of the key ingredients in most interesting economic, social, or politic...