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Marco LiCalzi
Ca' Foscari University of Venice
107Publications
14H-index
602Citations
Publications 107
Newest
We study a model where agents face a continuum of two-player games and categorize them into a finite number of situations to make sense of their complex environment. Agents need not share the same categorization. Each agent can cooperate or defect, conditional on the perceived category. The games are fully ordered by the strength of the temptation to defect and break joint cooperation. In equilibrium agents share the same categorization, but achieve less cooperation than if they could perfectly ...
#1Lorenzo Bastianello (University of Paris)
#2Marco LiCalzi (Ca' Foscari University of Venice)H-Index: 14
We revisit the Nash bargaining model and axiomatize a procedural solution that maximizes the probability of successful bargaining. This probability-based approach nests both the standard and the ordinal Nash solution, and yet need not assume that bargainers have preferences over lotteries or that choice sets are convex. We consider both mediator-assisted bargaining and standard unassisted bargaining. We solve a long-standing puzzle and offer a natural interpretation of the product operator under...
#1Robert Gibbons (NBER: National Bureau of Economic Research)H-Index: 40
#2Marco LiCalzi (Ca' Foscari University of Venice)H-Index: 14
Last.Massimo Warglien (Ca' Foscari University of Venice)H-Index: 15
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We study strategic interaction between agents who distill the complex world around them into simpler situations. Assuming agents share the same cognitive frame, we show how the frame affects equilibrium outcomes. In one-shot and repeated interactions, the frame causes agents to be either better or worse off than if they could perceive the environment in full detail: it creates a fog of cooperation or a fog of conflict. In repeated interaction, the frame is as important as agentsO patience in det...
#1Marco LiCalzi (Ca' Foscari University of Venice)H-Index: 14
#2Nadia Maagli (University of Paris)
Two agents endowed with different categorisations engage in bargaining to reach an understanding and agree on a common categorisation. We model the process as a simple non-cooperative game and demonstrate three results. When the initial disagreement is focused, the bargaining process has a zero-sum structure. When the disagreement is widespread, the zero-sum structure disappears and the unique equilibrium requires a retraction of consensus: two agents who individually associate a region with the...
#1Lorenzo Bastianello (University of Paris)
#2Marco LiCalzi (Ca' Foscari University of Venice)H-Index: 14
We revisit the Nash model for two-person bargaining. A mediator knows agents' ordinal preferences over feasible proposals, but has incomplete information about their acceptance thresholds. We provide a behavioural characterisation under which the mediator recommends a proposal that maximises the probability that bargainers strike an agreement. Some major solutions are recovered as special cases; in particular, we offer a straightforward interpretation for the product operator underlying the Nash...
#1Robert F. Bordley (UM: University of Michigan)H-Index: 4
#2Marco LiCalzi (Ca' Foscari University of Venice)H-Index: 14
Last.Luisa Tibiletti (UNITO: University of Turin)H-Index: 8
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The “hard-easy effect” is a well-known cognitive bias on self-confidence calibration that refers to a tendency to overestimate the probability of success in hard-perceived tasks, and to underestimate it in easy-perceived tasks. This paper provides a target-based foundation for this effect, and predicts its occurrence in the expected utility framework when utility functions are S-shaped and asymmetrically tailed. First, we introduce a definition of hard-perceived and easy-perceived task based on ...
#1Nadia Mâagli (Ca' Foscari University of Venice)
#2Marco LiCalzi (Ca' Foscari University of Venice)H-Index: 14
Two agents endowed with different individual conceptual spaces are engaged in a dialectic process to reach a common understanding. We model the process as a simple non-cooperative game and demonstrate three results. When the initial disagreement is focused, the bargaining process has a zero-sum structure. When the disagreement is widespread, the zero-sum structure disappears and the unique equilibrium requires a retraction of consensus: two agents who individually agree to associate a region wit...
#1Shira Fano (Bocconi University)H-Index: 2
#2Marco LiCalzi (Ca' Foscari University of Venice)H-Index: 14
Last.Paolo Pellizzari (Ca' Foscari University of Venice)H-Index: 11
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We study the emergence of strategic behavior in double auctions with an equal number of buyers and sellers, under the distinct assumptions that orders are cleared simultaneously or asynchronously. The evolution of strategic behavior is modeled as a learning process driven by a genetic algorithm. We find that, as the size of the market grows, allocative inefficiency tends to zero and performance converges to the competitive outcome, regardless of the order-clearing rule. The main result concerns ...
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